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Abstract 
Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens cannot provide information on 
the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household 
behaviour. They also do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-
groups of the population. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation 
model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the 
household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different 
definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of 
measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes;  
average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour; and marginal effective tax 
rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, these measures are broken 
down to separately analyse the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The 
results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, 
labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based 
indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large 
parts of the population. 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of most tax and transfer policy issues requires knowledge about how much is 
paid in taxes and received in benefits, by whom and in what circumstances. Moreover, in 
assessing existing tax-benefit policies and proposing reforms, it is useful to compare levels 
and structures of taxes and benefits across countries. The complexity of relevant rules 
governing tax liability and benefit entitlement and a lack of comprehensive and comparable 
data at the micro-level has led to major efforts being directed towards finding methods to 
construct simple summary indicators such as implicit effective tax rates based on revenue 
statistics and national accounts data (Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000; Martinez-Mongay, 
2000). Although these measures can provide important insights regarding aggregate payments 
they do not allow one to draw conclusions about marginal effective tax rates. While macro-
based average effective tax rates would be good approximations of marginal effective tax 
rates if net taxes paid per income unit were the same across incomes and across individuals, 
neither is true for tax-benefit systems. In other words, aggregate calculations do not give 
correct measures of the marginal tax rate because they do not consider the institutional rules 
as they apply to each taxpayer and benefit recipient. Obviously, macro-based figures also 
cannot answer questions about the detailed distribution of tax payments across the 
population.
2 This paper aims to fill these gaps by providing detailed measures of both average 
and marginal effective tax rates facing households in Europe. It uses an EU-wide 
microsimulation model (EUROMOD) to produce distributions and decompositions of these 
measures across households in fourteen Member States of the European Union (EU). 
 
Effective tax rates capture the net tax burden resulting from the interaction of different types 
of taxes and contributions on one hand and benefit payments on the other. Average effective 
tax rates (AETRs) express the resulting net payments as a fraction of the income on which 
they are levied. They are therefore useful in assessing the size of transfers to and from the 
government given the incomes and circumstances observed at a given point in time. Marginal 
effective tax rates (METRs), on the other hand, measure the degree to which any additional 
income would be ‘taxed away’. METRs are therefore useful measures for evaluating the 
financial incentives to engage in activities meant to generate or increase income. 
 
The accurate measurement of AETRs and METRs is important for a range of policy related 
questions which continue to receive attention in both academic and policy circles. Measures 
of effective tax rates have, for instance, been used as explanatory variables in studies 
concerning the influence of tax burdens on economic growth (Agell, et al., 1997; 1999), 
unemployment (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Martinez-Mongay and Fernández-Bayón, 2001) 
and wage setting behaviour (Sorensen, 1997). Clearly, many of the processes underlying these 
issues are strictly linked to the behaviour of individuals or households. In comparing and 
evaluating different tax-benefit systems one would therefore want to characterise them not 
only in terms of the effective tax burden of a single average (‘representative’) agent
3 but also 
in terms of the number and types of households and individuals who are, in fact, facing 
effective tax rates of the various magnitudes. In fact, from a distributional point of view, 
                                                        
2 Throughout the paper, I use the terms tax and benefit payments to refer to the actual amounts paid in tax or 
received as benefits, i.e., the formal incidence. How this relates to the final (‘economic’) incidence is discussed 
in section 3. 
3 This is, in effect, what effective tax rate measures based on macro-data do.   2
detailed knowledge about the incidence of tax and benefit payments is of interest in itself 
(e.g., Mercader-Prats, 1997). 
 
Although comparable and detailed household micro-data have become more readily available 
in recent years, the information contained in these data sources is nevertheless insufficient for 
calculating detailed AETRs and METRs. One reason is simply that variables on income tax 
(IT) or social insurance contributions (SIC) are often missing. Even if they are recorded, 
social insurance contributions paid by employers (or benefit paying institutions) on behalf of 
employees (or benefit recipients) will usually not be available (as shown below, employers’ 
contributions represent an important part of the tax burden borne by labour incomes). To 
overcome this problem simulation methods are frequently used to impute such missing 
information (Immervoll and O'Donoghue, 2001a; Weinberg, 1999). This basically entails 
combining the information on people’s status and incomes with a detailed representation of 
tax-benefit rules and provides all necessary information for computing AETRs. Importantly, 
the combination of micro-data with a model of tax and benefit rules in microsimulation 
models can be used to compute METRs which are not observed in the standard survey. By 
varying each observation’s incomes by a certain amount and then re-computing tax liabilities 
and benefit entitlements, the effective tax burden on any additional income can be captured. 
Finally, the parameterisation of tax-benefit rules built into microsimulation models permits 
effective tax rates to be computed under a range of different policy configurations. In the EU, 
such ‘forward-looking’ analyses of the likely impact of policy reforms on effective tax 
burdens are particularly relevant given the identification of ‘high’ or ‘excessive’ levels of 
taxation as a major policy concern.
4 
 
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a rationale for evaluating effective 
tax rates at the micro-level and compares approaches using empirical micro-data to macro-
based techniques as well as methods based on ‘synthetic’ households. Section 3 discusses the 
choices to be made in measuring effective tax rates and explains the precise approach adopted 
in the present study. The following sections present simulation results for fourteen countries. 
While section 4 provides household-level AETRs across all households taking into account 
all relevant taxes and benefits, section 5 focuses on the effective taxation of labour incomes. It 
presents individual-level estimates of the total tax ‘wedge’ resulting from the combination of 
IT and SIC. Section 6 evaluates relevant financial incentives for the working population by 
computing METRs. All results are presented in terms of their overall distribution of effective 
tax rates across the relevant populations as well as grouping by age, gender and other 
household characteristics. In discussing policy reforms targeted towards altering effective tax 
rates it is essential to understand which particular tax-benefit instruments are responsible for 
observed tax burdens. The distributions of METRs and AETRs are therefore decomposed in 
order to show the contributions of individual tax-benefit instruments. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Measuring effective tax rates – why look at the micro-level? 
International comparisons of tax systems have long relied on information about formal tax 
rules (such as the rate structure) or they have summarised their aggregate impact by relating 
                                                        
4 In 2000 the European Council has, for instance, committed the European Commission to assess “whether 
adequate measures are being taken in order to […] alleviate the tax pressure on labour […]” (Martinez-Mongay 
(2000), p. 6). Carone and Salomäki (2001) supply a recent contribution towards such an assessment.   3
total receipts to national income (these indicators are sometimes called ‘tax ratios’). One main 
shortcoming of this latter approach is that it disregards the tax base a tax is levied on. A ‘tax 
ratio’ for a certain type of income tax of x% may be the result of a combination of (a) a broad 
tax base and a low tax rate; or (b) a narrow tax base and a high tax rate. The economic 
consequences are, obviously, very different. To rectify this problem, there has, starting in the 
1990s, been a growing interest in methods seeking to derive measures of effective tax rates 
based on Revenue Statistics and National Accounts (Lucas, 1990, Mendoza, et al., 1994). By 
relating tax receipts to the relevant tax bases they provide a much better indicator of tax 
burdens. They are also attractive in that deriving comparable figures across countries is 
facilitated by the availability of internationally comparable sources of revenue statistics, such 
as those produced by the OECD, and standardised national accounts data. 
 
Obviously, macro-based measures cannot be used to investigate the micro-level incidence of 
tax payments. There are, however, other potential problems. One is related to the institutional 
characteristics in terms of how taxes and benefits are integrated in different countries and the 
fact that macro-based effective tax rates tend to focus on taxes and SIC while disregarding 
benefits. Child related payments may, for instance, be formally administered through the tax 
system in some countries (e.g., by means of refundable tax credits) and be paid as benefits in 
others. Clearly, excluding benefit payments in such cases means that the comparability of 
effective tax rates across countries will suffer. While, in principle, applying appropriate 
corrections would be straightforward, data on social transfers tends to be less comparable 
across countries than revenue statistics and incorporating them in multi-country studies can 
therefore be problematic. 
 
Technical difficulties also arise due to conceptual differences between revenue statistics and 
national accounts data. The former are, for instance, collected on a cash basis while the latter 
measure incomes as they accrue. As a result the timing of the two data sources diverges 
(Jacobs and Spengel, 1999). Several other issues are also related to differences in definitions 
and scope between the two data sources and a number of assumptions are required to align 
them (Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000). This range of potential problems has prompted a 
number of ‘health warnings’ being issued in order to make users of macro-based effective tax 
rates aware of their shortcomings (OECD, 2000b; c). The Working Party No. 2 on Tax Policy 
Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs takes the view that 
“AETR results relying on aggregate tax and national accounts data are potentially highly 
misleading indicators of relative tax burdens and tax trends” and that “further work relying on 
micro-data is required to assess the magnitude of potential biases to average tax rate figures 
derived from aggregate data.”
5 
 
In fact, there is an existing literature documenting various approaches of combining 
information on statutory tax rules and tax returns with data on income distribution and 
household surveys (Barro and Sahasakul, 1986; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Among 
researchers interested in the macroeconomic effects of taxation, however, these attempts have 
been met with some scepticism (although some authors have in fact used them as yardsticks 
for validating macro-based results) as it is considered doubtful whether “marginal tax rates 
that apply to particular individuals in a household survey, or a specific aggregation of 
                                                        
5 cited from Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), p. 5.   4
incomes based on tax-bracket weights, are equivalent to the aggregate tax rates that affect 
macroeconomic variables as measured in national accounts.”
6 This limitation certainly holds 
for tax rate calculations based on ‘typical’ households (such as OECD, 2000a) as such 
estimates, while illustrative, fail to take into account the heterogeneity of the population. 
Although extending these calculations to a wider range of ‘synthetic’ households can serve to 
improve our understanding of the mechanics built into tax-benefit systems the point remains 
that any calculations based on synthetic households cannot capture, in the correct proportions, 
the tax and benefit payments across the entire range of household types found in the 
population as a whole (Immervoll, et al., 2001). In contrast, calculations based on 
representative household micro-data can be used to derive aggregate measures of effective tax 
rates using any desired aggregation rule. At the same time, they are more informative than 
aggregate measures since they capture the distribution of effective tax rates across the 
population. 
 
As they are calculated based on statutory tax and benefit rules they are also particularly useful 
where a detailed knowledge of the structure and mechanics built into tax-benefit systems is 
important. There are two main cases where computing measures based on observed past tax 
receipts and tax bases (sometimes referred to as ‘backward-looking’ in the literature) cannot 
be used. First, measuring METRs requires assessing what would happen to tax burdens if 
incomes were to change. As tax-benefit systems are generally far from proportional, 
aggregate income changes are meaningless in this context. Instead, it is important whose 
income is changing. In a non-proportional tax-benefit system, METRs can therefore only be 
computed based on a knowledge of the distributions of incomes and other characteristics that 
determine tax liabilities and benefit entitlements. This problem is usually acknowledged in 
studies using macro-based measures of effective tax rates. However, since many of the 
distortionary effects of taxation that researchers are interested in are related to marginal rather 
than average tax rates, there is a worrying tendency to equate METRs with AETRs and use 
the latter as proxies for the former (see Mendoza, et al., 1994 for an example and Padovano 
and Galli, 2001 for a critique). 
 
A second area where ‘forward-looking’ methods of computing effective tax rates are 
particularly useful is in the analysis of policy reforms. There is often a need to evaluate 
reforms before detailed macro-economic data become available. Since the delays can be 
sizable simulation techniques can play an important role in an early evaluation of policy 
reforms.
7 By changing the parameters of the tax-benefit rules built into such simulation 
models, they can also be used to perform analyses of reforms that have not yet been 
implemented or are purely hypothetical. 
 
3.  Whose taxes, which incomes, what margins? 
Several choices have to be made when measuring effective tax rates. Most of them have 
important implications for the interpretation of the results and thus require some 
consideration. In fact, depending on the research questions it will often be desirable to 
compute effective tax rates in several different ways. A method which allows some flexibility 
is therefore valuable. 
                                                        
6 Mendoza, et al. (1994), p. 298 
7 Martinez-Mongay (2000) notes that there is generally a 2-3 year lag in the production of macro-based tax rates.   5
 
Before discussing the various decisions to be made and how microsimulation methods can be 
used to accommodate them it is useful to clarify the scope of the measurement exercise. 
AETRs measure some concept of total tax as a fraction of some concept of tax base. 
Obviously, the incidence of AETRs is therefore connected with the incidence of taxes. In 
studying questions of incidence one can be interested in the payments per se, or in the 
economic loss suffered by the taxpayer. For a particular taxpayer, this loss will, for two 
reasons, generally differ from the tax paid. First, taxes may, through influences on supply and 
demand at the market level, influence the prices of the goods and services produced or 
consumed by the taxpayer. Second, the taxpayer herself may, in response to price changes, 
adjust the basket of goods and services she produces or consumes and suffer welfare losses in 
the process. The familiar process of tax ‘shifting’ is of great interest to economists and any 
results on final incidence may be very sensitive to the degree of shifting.
8 
 
Moreover, there are many economic consequences of taxation that cannot be captured by 
looking at the amounts of taxes alone. To take an extreme example, a tax that, at a given point 
in time, generates no revenue at all may be detrimental to economic growth if it has made a 
certain type of productive activity so financially unattractive as to drive people away from 
engaging in it altogether. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that tax payments are an issue of 
public interest in themselves and therefore deserve investigation. The central issue then is to 
“distinguish clearly between tax payments and losses from taxation, and to recognise that the 
first is an accounting characteristic of a particular equilibrium, while the second requires the 
evaluation of a comparison between two alternative equilibria.”
9 
 
In this paper, effective tax rates are computed for a given ‘equilibrium’ as characterised by the 
information recorded in household micro-data of a particular year. While the resulting AETRs 
will, for the reasons stated above, not capture total losses associated with the imposition of 
taxes, any substitution effects caused by them do enter the results: If we assume that we are, 
in fact, looking at an equilibrium then people will already have adjusted their activities in 
response to the tax burdens imposed on them.
10 The aim of computing AETRs is to 
understand the extent and incidence of burdens resulting from tax payments and, to avoid 
confusion, there should be no claim that the incidence of AETRs can be used as some sort of 
approximation of the incidence of economic losses (relative to the tax base). Instead, tax 
payments are one component of incidence analyses and should be treated as such.
11 For 
METRs, on the other hand, no qualifications regarding any decisions about the appropriate 
                                                        
8 Indeed, imperfect competition may lead to over-shifting in the sense that the loss suffered by a taxpayer can be 
less than 0% or more than 100% of the amount of tax paid. See, for instance, Stern (1987). 
9 Dilnot, et al. (1990), p. 213. 
10 It should be emphasised that this implies an important qualification of studies looking at effects of policy 
reforms on the incidence of effective tax rates. If taxes and benefits are computed for a given (pre-reform) 
population then, conceptually, the assumption of an equilibrium will not be appropriate. To what extent taking 
into account behavioural responses following the reform would, in fact, noticeably change results is another 
matter. The usefulness of incorporating behavioural response in microsimulation-based policy evaluations will 
depend on the precise type and intent of the reform and on the extent to which underlying micro-data permit 
changes to be detected in a statistically meaningful way. For a discussion of some of these and related issues see 
Pudney and Sutherland (1994) and Creedy and Duncan (2002). 
11 Dilnot, et al. (1990) show how tax payments, income effects due to price changes and welfare loss as a result 
of substitution processes can be brought together in one unified framework.   6
treatment of tax shifting are required at all. The main reason why we are interested in METRs 
in the first place is their possible effect on behaviour or, in other words, their role in moving 
from ‘equilibrium 1’ to ‘equilibrium 2’. Clearly, METRs must therefore be evaluated under 
‘equilibrium 1’. 
 
While some of the methodological issues to be considered for effective tax rate measurement 
at the micro-level are similar or can at least be related to those facing researchers concerned 
with deriving macro-based measures, others only become apparent due to the level of detail 
which micro-based approaches support. Even though these issues exist, in principle, 
regardless of the level of aggregation, the data sources used for macro-based measures simply 
do not provide the same range choices. The relevant dimensions are (1) the types of taxes and 
benefits to take into account and the income (or ‘tax base’) to relate them to and (2) the unit 
of analysis and, related to it, the sharing of any incomes within the unit. In the case of METRs 
an additional issues is (3) the nature and size of the margin to be used for computing marginal 
effects. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.1  Tax-benefit instruments and definition of income base 
Although effective tax rates are supposed to provide broad measures of net tax payments, the 
choice of instruments to be incorporated in such a measure is not self-evident. Most studies 
consider taxes and ‘tax-like’ payments. However, it is not at all clear that SIC are, for 
example, equivalent to income taxes and it is undoubtedly the case that the degree of 
equivalence differs widely across countries. While, in principle, SIC are payments made in 
return for insurance coverage the link between income taxes and public services is not as 
direct. However, cross subsidies between the various ‘pots’ of public finances often make 
such a distinction less meaningful. In addition, social insurance schemes are, for the most 
part, compulsory and not characterised by a strict actuarial link between the value of 
insurance services and SIC paid. The discrepancy can be seen as performing functions (such 
as redistribution or raising revenues) normally associated with income tax. 
 
Section 2 has already hinted at comparability problems that can arise due to international 
differences in the structure of tax-benefit systems when the benefit side is ignored. As the 
distinction between tax concessions and benefits can be more or less arbitrary, tax-benefit 
models which allow an integrated view on the tax-benefit system as a whole are useful in this 
respect. There are, however, limitations nonetheless as these models usually focus on cash 
instruments. As a result, there are inherent difficulties in comparing effective tax rates of 
countries where, say, child care payments or housing benefits are paid an cash and those 
where these benefits are provided ‘in-kind’ through access to subsidised child-care or 
housing. A related question is that about the appropriate time-horizon of the calculations. 
Should some measure of future benefits financed by current SIC be taken into account?
 12 
 
Many of these issues become somewhat clearer once one considers the appropriate definition 
of income which is to enter the denominator of the AETR calculations (the tax base). If the 
purpose of studying the incidence of AETRs is assessing the distribution of the relative 
                                                        
12 The question here concerns pensions in particular, i.e., the distant future. There is less of an issue with means-
tested benefits which are, depending on current income, revised at the end of the current reference period (the 
‘near’ future). These should, as far as possible, be taken into account when computing METRs.   7
contribution of tax-benefit systems to current cash incomes (as in section 4) then any in-kind 
transfers as well as future incomes such as pension rights will be disregarded.
13 Similarly, if 
the focus is on evaluating the total tax burden on labour (as in section 5) then any taxes or 
benefits which are not strictly related to labour income (such as taxes on investment income, 
family benefits
14) should be disregarded. 
 
3.2  Unit of analysis and sharing within units 
A natural question to ask is whose effective tax rates we are interested in. Depending on the 
purpose, we may want to look at tax/benefit payments at the individual level, the level of the 
formal tax unit or some other notion of family or household. For distributional studies 
concerned with household welfare the household level will be appropriate (Canberra Group, 
2001). In measuring the tax wedge on labour, however, one would want to relate the relevant 
taxes directly to the labour incomes of those supplying labour (and hence chose the individual 
as the unit of analysis). 
 
Given that one distinguishing feature of households is the sharing of common resources (and 
given that we do not observe the precise sharing arrangements within households) studying 
units of analysis smaller than the household can be problematic. A particular issue arises due 
to the assessment unit built into statutory tax and benefit rules. These can be quite different 
for different instruments in a given country (e.g., individual SIC but joint IT) and, obviously, 
for equivalent instruments across countries. Although recent decades have, at least in the EU, 
seen a trend towards individual taxation, joint tax filing is current practice in a considerable 
number of countries (O'Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999). In addition, even if the tax schedule 
itself is applied to each individual separately, tax concessions such as tax free allowances or 
tax credits are often transferable between family members and therefore represent a ‘joint’ 
element. Notions of family or household are even more important in determining the 
eligibility for benefits and applicable amounts. With the important exception of insurance 
based benefits practically no type of benefit is targeted directly towards individual persons. 
Instead, the structure of families or households as well as their members’ characteristics and 
incomes are crucial determinants of benefit payments. Even insurance based benefits formally 
paid to the insured person often take into account family circumstances (e.g., minimum or 
basic pensions, unemployment benefits). 
 
Whenever taxes or benefits are explicitly or implicitly targeted towards more than one person, 
the question how these payments are shared between members of an assessment unit is crucial 
if the unit of analysis is smaller than the unit of assessment. Should benefits be shared equally 
among all members of the household, or just among adults, or should payments be assigned 
according to some equivalence scale? Similarly, what is the best basis for sharing jointly paid 
income taxes? Should it be in proportion to the tax base or should those with higher income 
                                                        
13 There would still be an issue of what ‘current’ means. Normally, income distribution studies take the year as 
their reference period (Canberra Group (2001)). In the context of effective tax rate calculations based on micro-
data, this means that annual income data would be ideal. Some data sources, however, measure income over a 
shorter period (see appendix 1). Although these data can, of course, be annualised, time-period differences in the 
original data need to be borne in mind in comparative studies as income changes during the year will, for a 
particular household, imply that annual income is not equal to one particular month’s income times 12. 
14 As illustrated by the ‘tax concessions versus benefits’ example in section 2, the treatment of benefits is not 
always straightforward. If family related tax concessions in country A are allowed to reduce effective tax rates 
then, for symmetry reasons, the same may need to hold for family benefits in country B.   8
pay progressively more? Inevitably, these decisions are, to some degree, arbitrary. The value 
of calculations based on micro-data lies in raising the issue in the first place and forcing 
analysts to be explicit about the decisions they adopt. 
 
3.3  Nature and size of margin used for computing METRs 
Additional issues arise in computing the effective tax burden on marginal income changes. 
They relate to the exact features of the change. While marginal tax rates could in principle be 
found analytically by taking first differences of the relevant effective tax schedule this is not 
possible in practice as tax-benefit systems are characterised by discontinuities. The 
straightforward approach then is to derive METRs numerically simply by altering income, 
using a tax-benefit model to re-compute relevant taxes and benefits and comparing the results 
with the original situation: 
 
METR = 1- ( ((y1 + d) (1 – t2) – y1 (1 – t1)) / d  )     (1) 
 
where y1 is the original pre-tax-benefit income, d is the margin and t1 and t2 are the AETRs 
applying, respectively, to y1 and y1+d. y1(1–t1) and (y1+d)(1–t2) are, therefore, the incomes 
after taxes and benefits (before and after the income change). Similar to sections 3.1 and 3.2 
above, relevant decisions concern the definition of y1, the tax-benefit instruments to be taken 
into account in computing t1 and t2, as well as the unit of analysis used for measuring 
incomes. In addition, the size (and direction) of d is important and leads to different 
interpretations of resulting METRs. In establishing work incentives, one will often be 
interested in a small income change, such as a small fixed percentage rise in earnings or the 
rise in gross earnings due to an additional hour of work. However, the margin can also be 
earnings as a whole. 1-METR is then equivalent to the concept of a replacement rate (of 
moving from in-work to out-of work in the case of d = -earnings and out-of-work to in-work 
in the case of d = potential earnings). For such ‘large’ margins, however, it is often not 
sufficient to only change income before re-computing taxes and benefits. In addition, several 
other characteristics which are available in the micro-data and which, in addition to income, 
are potential determinants of taxes and benefits (variables such as hours of work, employment 
status, economic sector) will have to be altered as well (see Immervoll and O'Donoghue, 
2001c). 
 
If one is concerned with financial incentives then the appropriate choice of a unit is 
particularly important. If a person’s additional earnings reduce the household’s entitlement to 
housing benefits then this is likely to be a consideration she will take into account. Similarly, 
an important consequence of joint taxation of married couples is that, from the couple’s point 
of view, the lower earning spouse faces, for a lower level of earnings, the same marginal tax 
rate as his/her higher earning partner. Clearly, to bring out these facts, METRs would need to 
be computed for the relevant unit as a whole. For multi-person units, however, another 
decision to be made is who to attribute d to. Since for the unit as a whole, METRs will be 
different depending on who earns the additional amount, it will often be appropriate to 
evaluate different scenarios. For example, in order to separately analyse financial work 
incentives for men and women one may analyse METRs evaluated for the household as a 
whole under the alternative assumptions that female / male members of household increase 
their earnings (see section 6).   9
 
4.  The contribution of tax-benefit systems to households’ current disposable 
incomes 
Average effective tax rates can provide a convenient description of the degree to which 
household incomes are affected by taxes and benefits. The household perspective allows one 
to put aside issues related to the unit of analysis as discussed in section 3.2. The concern with 
current incomes also makes redundant any questions about the degree to which current taxes 
or SICs can be seen as savings financing future benefits. But an important consideration that 
remains is which components of current income should be counted in the numerator and 
denominator of the AETR. For most components such as earnings, taxes, SIC, family 
benefits, etc., the decision is straightforward. It is less clear-cut, however, for incomes which 
are partly insurance based but are also characterised by some elements of outright transfers to 
the recipient household. In cross-country studies, the issue is complicated by the fact that, for 
similar policy instruments, the “mix” between insurance and transfers varies widely across 
countries. This is particularly the case for pensions and unemployment benefits. 
 
For the purpose of this section, I consider all replacement incomes, such as old-age pensions 
and unemployment benefits, whether contributory or not, part of the tax base (i.e., pre-tax-
benefit income denominator of the AETR) and not as benefits that reduce the net taxes paid 
by households. The AETRs for recipients of these incomes therefore do not reflect the 
generosity of these instruments but the extent to which they are subject to (net) tax payments. 
Other replacement incomes which enter the tax base include maternity benefits, sickness 
benefits, disability insurance and survivor/orphan benefits. SIC paid by the employer are not 
part of pre-tax-benefit income. The numerator of the AETR consists of all taxes paid by the 
household plus compulsory own SIC minus family benefits, care benefits, social 
assistance/minimum income benefits and all other ‘non-replacement’ cash transfers such as 
housing benefits. 
 
For each household, the relevant income components are either taken directly from the micro-
data (earnings, pensions, etc.) or simulated using EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit model. 
The sources of micro-data used in this exercise are listed in appendix 1. The same micro-data 
are also used by EUROMOD as the basis for simulating income taxes, SIC as well as means-
tested and universal benefit payments.
15 A simulation of these income components is 
necessary in cases where they are not recorded in the micro-data. In addition, simulation is 
required in order to compute changes in taxes and transfers following marginal income 
changes (section 6). EUROMOD is an integrated microsimulation model of the tax-benefit 
systems of all fifteen EU Member States. It permits common definitions of income concepts, 
units of analysis, sharing ‘rules’, etc. to be used across countries and therefore is a suitable 
instrument for computing effective tax rates in a comparable or, at least, reconcilable way.
16 
The tax and benefit rules underlying all calculations in this paper are those for 1998. 
 
                                                        
15 In this paper, simulated tax and benefit amounts are computed under the assumption of no tax evasion and 
100% benefit take-up. 
16 Details on EUROMOD and the simulated tax-benefit instruments can be found in Immervoll, et al. (1999), 
Sutherland (2001b) and Immervoll and O'Donoghue (2001b).   10
Table 1 shows the distribution of household AETRs for fourteen countries along with the 
number of observations for each AETR band (modal values are shown in bold typeface). 
Large difference between median and mean in some countries are a first indication of the 
spread of AETRs across the population. While the amount of taxes and own SIC paid in the 
country as a whole is, relative to pre-tax-benefit income, similar in Ireland and the UK, the 
median is very different: half of Irish households pay less than 6% in net taxes with just under 
20% having their incomes entirely unaffected by the tax-benefit system. The mean average 
effective tax burden on pre-tax-benefit income including replacement incomes is highest in 
Denmark and, at about a third of the Danish level, lowest in the UK, Ireland and Spain. 
 
Taking a closer look at the distribution we see that a considerable number of households are 
net benefit recipients with between 8% in Denmark and 30% in the UK having negative 
AETRs. For this group, non-replacement incomes exceed pre-tax benefit incomes. The fact 
that Denmark and the UK are the two extremes in this respect is instructive as one would a 
priori expect Denmark to have a more generous social transfer system. In interpreting these 
results it is important to keep in mind that AETRs depend on both net-taxes and pre-tax-
benefit incomes. If in a given country, there are more households where all household 
members are benefit recipients, we will therefore see a larger number of negative AETRs 
even if the benefits are less generous. Equally important, counting replacement incomes as 
pre-tax-benefit incomes will tend to push AETRs upwards for those countries with generous 
unemployment benefits and/or pensions: If people are entitled to these payments they will 
obviously be less likely to fall back on ‘last-resort’ benefits such as social assistance or other 
means tested transfers. 
 
Given the dissimilar distributions it is interesting to analyse which household characteristics 
are related to the level of AETRs. The interaction of the various characteristics of interest 
could be captured using regression techniques. I defer this approach to future work and 
instead show as a first step tables focussing on one characteristic at a time. Table 2 shows 
how the distributions differ for different income groups.
17 While in the UK the tax burden 
borne by the top quintile is one of the lowest, this country also has the most ‘progressive’ 
system in that the average AETR in the top quintile is more than 100 percentage points higher 
than that for the bottom 20%. This does, of course, not mean that the mechanisms built into 
the tax-benefit system are in themselves necessarily more ‘progressive’ than in other 
countries. An important factor behind these numbers is the distribution of pre-tax-benefit 
incomes: More unequal distributions will, for a given structure of tax-benefit system, also 
result in larger disparities between effective tax burdens. In particular, if low-income groups 
draw a very large part of their income from social transfers (UK, Finland, Greece) then 
AETRs can be highly negative, leading to large percentage point differences when compared 
to AETRs of higher income groups.
18 
 
One main factor determining pre-tax-benefit incomes is the labour market status of household 
members. Table 3 considers two of the relevant groups; those economically “active” 
                                                        
17 In computing quintile points, differences in household size and composition have been corrected for using the 
‘modified OECD’ equivalence scale. In dividing the population into five equally sized groups, households have 
been weighted by their size. 
18 It is instructive that, in the UK, the difference in means between the top quintile group and the first quantile 
with non-negative mean AETRs (quintile group 3) is one of the lowest among the fourteen countries.   11
(employed or self-employed) and the retired. Since AETRs are computed here on a household 
basis the status refers to that of the head of household.
19 For the groups as a whole, net taxes 
relative to pre-tax-benefit incomes are at least twice as high for the ‘active’ group in nine out 
of fourteen countries. In Ireland and Portugal the majority of households headed by a retired 
person do in fact face zero AETRs and are, thus, outside the scope of the tax-benefit system. 
While this is not the case in the UK, the mean AETR for retired people is negative indicating 
a large number of retired people with low pensions who are dependent on minimum income 
and other means-tested benefits. A large number of negative AETRs is also found among the 
retired group in Finland. Turning to the ‘active’ group the largest incidence of high AETRs is 
found in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium where, respectively, more than 
89%, 49%, 41% and 40% of ‘active’ households are faced with AETRs in excess of 30%. The 
relevant proportion in the UK (2.5%) is the lowest of all fourteen countries followed by Spain 
with just under 4%. 
 
Table 4 shows separate distributions for different age groups (referring, again, to the head of 
household) and confirms the picture of clearly lower AETRs applying to those drawing their 
main income from old-age pensions. One can again see a large number of zero AETRs among 
the ‘>65’ households in Ireland and Portugal and also Spain. Along the age profile, AETRs in 
all countries follow an inverted ‘U’ shape which is particularly pronounced in Finland, 
Germany, Greece and the UK. The largest number of net benefit recipients among households 
headed by young (<25) people can be found in the Netherlands followed by the UK, Finland 
and Germany. A final breakdown of household AETRs is provided in table 5 where 
distributions are presented for a range of family structures. Single parent households are 
subject to lower effective tax rates than the overall population in all countries. With negative 
medians, they are mainly net benefit recipients in seven out of fourteen countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and, most clearly, the UK). Again, 
this may be due to generous benefits being available to them (such as in Belgium
20) or to a 
lack of earning opportunities forcing them to rely on social transfers (whatever their level) or 
a combination of the two. Upon first inspection it may be surprising that households without 
children face lower AETRs than those with children in some countries (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, in particular). This is to a large extent due to retired people being part of 
the ‘no children’ group. Once they are excluded (column ‘No Children; Head not retired’) 
households with children face lower AETRs than those without in all countries but Spain 
where a small difference in favour of childless households remains. 
 
How important are individual tax-benefit instruments in determining effective tax burdens? 
To answer this question, the various levels of AETRs in all countries have been decomposed 
in terms of the instruments that drive them. The results are shown in figure 1 where the 
contribution of each instrument to the total net taxes is shown for the different AETR bands.
21 
The bars all have the same total height (100%) so that a similar sized ‘tax’ section in AETR 
bands ’40 to 45’ and ’20 to 25’ would, for instance, indicate an average amount of income tax 
                                                        
19 The ‘head of household’ is defined as the person with the highest earnings; if there is more than one person 
with the same (or zero) earnings, the oldest among them is taken to be the ‘head’. 
20 See Immervoll, et al. (2001). 
21 ‘Other Benefits’ are care benefits, educational grants and other transfers that do not fit into any of the other 
three benefit categories. As before, replacement incomes such as pensions or unemployment benefits are not 
counted as ‘benefits’ here but included in the ‘tax base’.   12
in the former band being, in absolute terms, about twice as large as that in the latter band. 
Negative components (benefits) are those which reduce net taxes in each AETR band. Note 
that bars have been omitted for AETR bands with fewer than 10 observations. Except for that, 
however, the graphs say nothing about the incidence of the various AETR levels so that it is 
important to read them in conjunction with table 1. In addition to the contribution of 
individual tax-benefit instruments figure 1 graphs, for each AETR band, average per-capita 




As expected, higher tax-bases are generally subject to higher AETRs. As in table 2, however, 
the degree of progressivity varies across countries. Notably, we see that in four of the 
countries (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain) the highest AETRs are not paid by those with the 
highest ‘tax-base’. This is frequently due to upper contribution limits above which no 
(additional) SIC are due. However, taxes other than income tax (wealth and property tax) also 
play a role as these may lead to high total tax burdens relative to income. The balance 
between taxes and SIC as revenue generating instruments differs widely. In Denmark, Finland 
and the UK taxes represent, throughout the AETR spectrum, more than 75% of total 
household payments to the government. At the other extreme, own SIC paid by Austrians 
markedly exceed taxes in most AETR bands. On the benefit side, we see family benefits 
being a particularly important contributor to net benefit receipts of low-income households in 
Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and Belgium. The dependence of low-income households on 
minimum income benefits is strongest in Greece and Ireland while housing related cash 
benefits play an important role in this respect in the UK, France and Germany. In Denmark 
and the Netherlands, housing benefits are, as a fraction of total net taxes, largest for 
households with pre-tax-benefit incomes above about 40% of the median while for lower-
income groups they are less important. 
 
5.  The effective tax burden on labour income 
The focus in this section is on the tax burden borne by labour incomes. As briefly discussed 
above this means that AETRs need to be evaluated for the individuals supplying the worked 
hours. It also requires a different definition of ‘net taxes’ and ‘tax base’ than the exercise in 
section 4. First, although we are, again, only concerned with payments rather than the total 
‘losses’ they give rise to, it should not matter who pays the taxes formally.
23 As a result, 
employer SIC paid on behalf of the employee are included in the numerator of the AETR ratio 
along with own SIC and income taxes. Since it is the burden on total labour income we are 
interested in employer SIC also need to be added to employment income to yield the ‘tax 
base’ denominator.
24 As a rule, benefits are not subtracted from the numerator. An exception 
                                                        
22 Per-capita levels have, again, been derived using the ‘modified OECD’ equivalence scale. 
23 There is, however, a long-running debate whether SIC paid by employers have a stronger or more immediate 
effect on labour demand than own SIC. For arguments in support of this link see, for instance, Leibfritz, et al. 
(1997). For recent empirical evidence pointing towards little effect of payroll taxes on labour demand see Bauer 
and Riphahn (2002). 
24 It should be noted that the calculations do not take into account components of ‘non-wage labur costs’ that 
cannot be simulated using household micro-data. These include payroll taxes that depend on firm-specific 
characteristics. However, employer SIC as simulated by EUROMOD do represent the major part of total payroll 
taxes. Another area where household micro-data typically do not provide detailed information is the provision of 
voluntary employer insurance contributions to occupational pension plans, etc. To the extent that these vary   13
are in-work benefits in the UK (Family Credit in 1998; now Working Families’ Tax Credit) 
which constitute a tax concession particularly designed to increase net labour incomes.
25 
 
An interesting conceptual question concerns the treatment of consumption taxes. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that, as they also reduce earners’ consumption opportunities, 
they need to be included in calculations of the ‘labour tax wedge’ by adding them to the 
AETR numerator.
26 However, a contrasting view is that, since consumption taxes apply to 
both earners and non-earners, they do not constitute a ‘labour tax wedge’ and therefore do not 
matter for studying the relationship of tax burdens and unemployment (Daveri and Tabellini, 
2000). In the results presented here, I implicitly adopt the second view as, for technical 




Since AETRs are computed at an individual level rather than for the household as a whole it 
is necessary to assume sharing arrangements for joint income taxes. In this exercise, it is 
assumed that any joint income tax burdens of a joint tax unit are shared in proportion to 
taxable income.
28 Another issue concerns the treatment of self-employment incomes which, 
by their nature, are part labour income and part income from capital. Carey and 
Tchilinguirian, 2000 present an approach which attempts to identify these components in the 
correct proportions at the macro-level. Due to the generally poor quality of self-employment 
income variables as available in micro-data sources the present paper does not attempt to 
approximate appropriate shares of labour and capital components and instead restricts its 
scope to employees only. This is important when interpreting results for countries where self-
employment incomes are important (e.g., Greece, Portugal) and may frequently represent a 
‘second-choice’ substitute for regular employment. 
 
Because income taxes are levied on the sum of all taxable income it is not entirely 
straightforward to find the tax paid on labour income alone in cases where individuals have 
income from more than one source. The approach taken here is to find the average income tax 
rate which applies to taxable income as a whole and to assume that this rate applies uniformly 
to all taxable income components (a result of this assumption is that AETRs on labour 
incomes will tend to be underestimated in countries where other income sources, such as 
income from capital, are effectively taxed at a lower rate). A similar method is used for 
computing the average labour ‘tax’ rate due to SIC. As people can, at a given point in time, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
between countries, any results based on such data-sources may not adequately capture these differences. This 
will also be true for the numbers presented in this paper. 
25 For a discussion of the properties of UK in-work benefits see, for instance, Blundell and Hoynes 
(forthcoming). 
26 According to Layard, et al. (1991), p. 209, for instance, this wedge is “the gap between real labour costs of the 
firm […] and the real, post-tax consumption wage of the worker”. 
27 Most EUROMOD datasets are income surveys containing no information on expenditures. While there are 
ways to impute the relevant variables from expenditure surveys, using imputed values for studying distributional 
issues on a disaggregated level can be problematic. See Baldini, et al. (forthcoming) and Sutherland, et al. 
(2002). 
28 After any deductions, i.e., the income to which the tax schedule applies. In some countries, such as Belgium, 
tax schedules are formally individual based but as considerable amounts of taxable income are transferable from 
the higher-earning to the lower-earning spouse, a sizable ‘joint’ element exists nevertheless. In these cases, I 
treat the transfer as a tax-concession for higher-earning spouses, i.e., they are still assumed to pay the tax due on 
any transferred taxable income, albeit at the lower rate at which the lower-earnings spouse would be taxed.   14
have more than one income subject to SIC (e.g., employment and self-employment income) it 
is assumed that the resulting average ‘tax’ rate applies uniformly to all components of the SIC 
base. In a last step, the average income tax and SIC rates are added up to find total AETRs on 
labour income. 
 
The results for the employed population (non-civil servants and aged 18-64) are presented in 
table 6a.
29,30 First, it is instructive to compare the mean effective tax burdens to those 
resulting from existing macro-based studies. There are, of course, important conceptual 
differences and one would therefore not expect to find similar numbers. Nevertheless, results 
from different studies should at least to some degree be reconcilable if they are to be useful 
for policy analysis purposes. In table 6b EUROMOD results for employees are compared with 
those reported in Martinez-Mongay, 2000: 27. In both cases, countries are ranked in 
descending order of AETRs. We see that EUROMOD results are higher in all fourteen 
countries and this is particularly true for countries such as Portugal, Greece, Italy or Spain, 
where tax evasion plays a role (as mentioned in section 4, the results in this paper refer to 
theoretical tax and SIC liabilities in a situation of no tax evasion). More importantly, 
however, one should keep in mind that the micro-based approach used here is able to focus 
exclusively on the income taxes and SIC paid by those working during the entire year (see 
footnote 30) and thus isolate the effective tax burden on labour incomes alone. Macro-based 
AETRs are distorted in this respect as they cannot easily separate those parts of taxes and SIC 
levied on labour incomes from those levied on unemployment benefits, pensions, etc. There 
are other data-related issues that can help explain discrepancies between micro- and micro-
based AETR estimates such as a known under-representation of very high incomes in 
underlying household surveys (Sutherland, 2001a). With the notable exception of 
Luxembourg and Portugal as well as Italy the ordering of countries in the first two columns of 
table 6b is, nevertheless, remarkably similar for both sets of measures. 
 
While this is somewhat reassuring the main point of computing AETRs based on micro-data 
is to gain an understanding of the distributions of tax payments. Indeed, the results indicate 
that the ranking of countries can be very different depending on the group of interest. On the 
right-hand side of table 6b, we see that, depending on earnings levels, countries’ positions 
vary by between two (Belgium, Italy, UK) and eleven (Germany) ranks. The rankings of male 
and female earners are more similar although mean average effective tax rates for men are up 
to 20% higher than for women (UK). For the group of (non-civil service) employees as a 
whole, we see from table 6a that they are generally less dispersed than for the household 
based AETRs in section 4. In particular, since the total tax burden here is defined as income 
tax plus SIC without any consideration for benefits, there are very few negative net tax 
burdens on labour incomes (tax credits can, as in the UK, nevertheless cause negative 
                                                        
29 Civil servants are excluded because the details and degree to which their insurance benefits are financed by 
employers vary widely across countries. Any results including civil servants would therefore be difficult to 
interpret. While authorities employing civil servants explicitly pay employer SIC in some countries, such 
contributions can neither be identified nor simulated in others. 
30 The ‘working population’ sub-sample here is restricted to those working during the entire period to which the 
income information in the micro-data refer to. The purpose of excluding people who have been working only 
part of that period while being unemployed, retired or ‘inactive’ during the rest is to avoid mixing AETRs 
relating to labour incomes with those that apply to unemployment benefits, pensions and other replacement 
incomes. Not correcting for this would make it difficult to compare results for countries with annual income 
information with those where incomes are measured on a monthly or weekly basis.   15
AETRs). Nevertheless, the width of the distribution is still considerable. AETR bands 
encompassing more than 10% of the working population are spread over a range of at least 15 
percentage points and up to 40 percentage points in Greece. We also see a considerable 
number of earners where gross labour costs equal net earnings (zero AETRs in Greece, 
Ireland, Germany and the UK). In all fourteen countries, using aggregate or mean AETRs 
alone would clearly provide a poor representation of the tax burden faced by a major part of 
the working population. 
 
The number of negative and zero AETRs in Germany, Greece, Ireland and the UK is 
sufficiently large to produce a zero median AETR for the lowest gross earnings decile group 
(table 7).
31 Indeed, UK mean AETRs for this group are negative, indicating substantial 
refundable tax credits for employees with very low earnings. The highest AETRs apply to top 
earning levels in Belgium with income taxes, employee SIC and employer SIC summing up 
to more than 60% of gross earnings. The lowest effective tax burdens on very high earnings 
are found in Ireland and the UK. However, top earners are not always subject to the highest 
AETRs. In both Germany and the Netherlands, certain compulsory SIC are no longer due at 
all above the upper contribution limit as employees are supposed to find their own insurance. 
While in the Netherlands, very substantial jumps in marginal income tax rates in the high 
income range (from 6.35% to 50% and 60%) produce income tax burdens which more than 
compensate for the drop in SIC, this is not the case in Germany. 
 
The regressive nature of SIC is even more visible in France where, in conjunction with 
progressive but small income taxes, they produce a very flat effective tax rate structure. This 
is confirmed in figure 2 showing the contribution of income tax and SIC to the various levels 
of effective tax burdens. Similar to figure 1 the tax base (right hand scale, here earnings plus 
employer SIC) is shown in relation to the median and as before, a negative bar indicates that, 
for this AETR band, the relevant income component reduces the AETR on average. SIC are a 
more important determinant of AETR than income taxes in all countries but Denmark, Ireland 
and also the UK. With the exception of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK, 
employer SIC represent a larger component of AETRs than own SIC (particularly in Belgium 
and Italy). 
 
6.  No pain no gain? Marginal effective tax rates for working men and women 
Tax-benefit models can be used to numerically compute METRs by altering income variables 
observed in the micro-data, re-computing taxes and benefits and comparing them with taxes 
and benefits before the income change. As the concern here is with measuring METRs for the 
working population the income being changed is earnings and the chosen margin is +3%. For 
the purpose of this paper METRs are, for reasons stated in section 2, measured at the 
household level. The change in net taxes following the 3% earnings increase takes into 
account any changes in cash income (inclusing income taxes, own SIC and all simulated 
benefits). 
 
While changes in net taxes are summed across all members of household they will generally 
be different depending on which members of household face the change in earnings. This is 
                                                        
31 Deciles in table 7 are computed in relation to the ‘tax base’ of the working population, i.e., on the basis of 
individual gross earnings plus employer SIC.   16
particularly important when evaluating financial incentives of higher/lower earning spouses to 
increase earnings. To capture these differences, METRs are computed separately for men and 
women. In other words, for households with female and male earners METRs are computed 
twice with the 3% earnings increase going, in turn, to women and men.
32 The target group is 
restricted to the working population aged 18-64.
33 
 
Results for this group as a whole are shown in table 8. With median METRs ranging between 
about 25% (Portugal and Spain) and more than 50% (Denmark, Germany) women tend to 
face lower METRs than men in all countries but Germany. By far the largest number of 
earners facing METRs in excess of 50% is found in Denmark (86% of all earners) followed 
by Germany (60%). On the other end of the spectrum, roughly one fourth of earners in Greece 
and Spain (24%) would retain the full amount of a 3% earnings increase (METR equal to, or 
less than, zero).
34 Denmark and the UK have the most concentrated distributions of METRs 
with 51% and 48% of the entire working population located in just one single 5 percentage 
point METR band (50 to 55% in Denmark; 30 to 35% in the UK). 
 
For the latter two countries, METRs differ, in fact, very little between different (household-) 
income groups (table 9a). METRs between the highest and lowest decile group differ by little 
more than ten percentage points. In the UK, earners in the bottom two decile groups are 
subject to considerably larger marginal tax burdens than their high-income counterparts – a 
result of high withdrawal rates for both means tested benefits (Income Support, Job Seekers’ 
Allowance, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit) and in-work benefits (Family Credit) and 
SIC thresholds below which no contributions are payable. Among earners in the bottom decile 
group, women in the UK are subject to higher METRs than men and therefore appear to be 
more likely to face situations where large amounts of any additional earnings are effectively 
taxed away through benefit withdrawals. A similar spike in METRs at low income levels 
exists in Ireland (for women) and Portugal (for men) while in the other countries the joint 
effects of benefit withdrawals and tax/SIC thresholds appear to affect the working population 
to a lesser extent. In Denmark, the small differences in METRs between high and low income 
earners is less related to exceptionally high marginal rates at the bottom than to a very flat 
income tax schedule. 
 
This is also visible in table 9b showing METRs by individual earnings deciles. The most 
interesting dimension here, however, is that of gender differentials. While METRs for the 
                                                        
32 In households with more than one (working-age) earner of the same sex each of them simultaneously receives 
a 3% increase. The resulting METRs for these households can thus be interpreted as an average between each of 
those earners. 
33 However, since METRs are meaningful regardless of the type and duration of work activities the group is 
much less restricted and includes civil servants, the self-employed, and those with more than one labour market 
status during the observation period. 
34 Negative METRs, while relatively rare, can be caused by tax concessions or benefits which are contingent 
upon having income of at least a certain level. Those with income just below that level will see their after-tax-
benefit income rise by more than the 3% earnings increase. In addition, and as mentioned in section 5, some 
countries (Germany, the Netherlands) operate SIC schemes where earners of incomes beyond the upper 
contribution level are no longer liable to pay any SIC. Clearly, this will cause METRs of some high-income 
earners to be negative. Of course, people no longer covered by the compulsory social insurance scheme will 
normally continue to pay insurance contributions on a voluntary basis. This important qualification of all 
effective tax rate results based exclusively on compulsory taxes and SIC applies also to the results presented in 
this paper.    17
working population as a whole were generally lower for women we now see a more diverse 
picture. In countries with joint income tax filing, women tend to face higher METRs than men 
in the same earnings group (France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain). For 
some decile groups, noticeable differences also exist where there are tax systems that, 
although not formally employing a joint tax base, allow sizable parts of income or tax 
concessions to be transferred from the higher- to the lower earnings spouse. The scatter plot in 
figure 3 illustrates the direction and extent of METR gender differentials across countries: 
Those cases in table 9b where METRs for women exceed those for men in the same earnings 
group are below the 45-degree line (and vice versa). Overall, this points towards higher 
METRs for women although the situation differs widely between countries. 
 
Taking a closer look at which tax-benefit instruments drive METRs the important role of 
benefits is clearly visible in figure 4. The withdrawal of means-tested benefits is the major 
contributor to very high (>80%) METRs in all countries but Greece, where the withdrawal of 
income tax concessions is more important.
35 These are also very relevant in the UK where the 
tapering-away of in-work benefits has a noticeable effect. We also note that, throughout all 
countries, the highest METRs are not faced by the highest-earning individuals but by those 
earning (often substantially) less than the median earner (dashed line in figure 4). Indeed, 
those living on incomes below the poverty threshold are clearly more likely to face situations 
where very high parts of any additional earnings are lost mainly through lower benefits (table 
10). Such ‘poverty traps’ can be identified in all countries, again with the exception of Greece 
where means-tested benefits are generally less important.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to introduce a microsimulation based method to assess effective tax 
rates and to present results for fourteen EU Member States. It was argued that effective tax 
burdens faced by people can differ substantially depending on the particular labour market 
and household situation and that these differences matter when assessing the economic 
consequences of tax-benefit systems. 
 
The distributions of both average and marginal effective tax rates show that summing up the 
effective tax burden using one single average or macro-based figure can provide very 
misleading pictures of effective tax burdens for large numbers of people. Micro-based 
measures of effective tax rates therefore have an important role in enriching and 
complementing indicators based on macro-data or ‘typical household’ type calculations. In 
addition, marginal effective tax rates are impossible to derive looking at aggregates alone. The 
results in this paper show that differences between average and marginal effective tax rates in 
both level and distribution can be substantial and that using average tax rates as proxies for 
marginal rates will therefore often be problematic. 
 
                                                        
35 As, in some countries, unemployment benefit amounts cannot be simulated (but are instead taken from the 
micro-data) due to lacking information on contribution histories, any means-testing of these benefit amounts are 
not captured in the results reported here. Countries where unemployment benefits are not simulated and, in 1998, 
did depend on other household members’ incomes are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Spain. As a result, METRs for low-earning individuals in these countries represent lower-bound 
estimates. Details on the simulations for each country can be found in the EUROMOD country reports available 
through www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm.   18
One attraction of computing macro-based effective tax rates is that it is relatively 
straightforward and, given the availability of consistent international data, can easily be 
implemented across different countries. An assessment of effective tax burdens at the micro-
level, on the other hand, is confronted with a large number of conceptual and definitional 
issues as the discussion in this paper has shown. This is particularly true when comparing 
rates across a number of countries. This multitude of measurement issues raises two relevant 
questions. First, is it feasible? Given the effort needed to build simulation models, harmonise 
micro-data and keeping both policy rules and data sources up-to-date, undertaking 
comprehensive multi-country studies on a regular basis seems difficult. Microsimulation 
models, however, are useful for a multitude of purposes (e.g., Atkinson, 2002). Similar to 
micro-data they can therefore be considered as research infrastructure. If supported as such 
the effort and amount of resources needed for any particular study will become less 
prohibitive as synergies between different model applications are exploited. 
 
A second question is whether the considerable number of choices to be made in deriving 
micro-based tax burden measures and the potential sensitivity of results with respect to these 
choices make results difficult to interpret. The absence of such detailed choices in the case of 
macro-based tax burden indicators does, however, not mean that these choices are irrelevant. 
Rather, any numbers based on approaches where questions regarding, for instance, the 
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Table 1. Distribution of Household Average Effective Tax Rates                           
   AT  BE  DK FI FR GE  GR IR  IT  LU NL PT SP UK 
median [%]  20.0  16.9  34.0 21.1 17.1 15.0 13.7  5.8  19.7 12.1 23.8 12.7 11.3 13.8 
mean [%]  22.9  22.4  37.1 22.0 18.1 23.7 20.9 13.2 24.3 18.0 25.6 18.7 16.6 12.7 



























































<=-100 1.5 50 5.7 150 3.0 75 8.9 474 3.5 389  6.4 406  6.0 294  6.0 158 0.9 71  1.3 30  6.9 294 2.1 123  0.4 32  14.8 991
-100 to -50 2.3 49 1.5 41 0.9 27 4.7 279 3.0 345  2.0 156  1.3 77  1.7 65 1.3 90  1.5 42  1.2 57 0.8 50  0.3 14  4.5 302
-50 to -40 0.6 17 0.6 17 0.4 10 1.5 94 1.1 115  0.7 41  0.4 22  1.0 45 0.6 47  0.8 23  0.4 19 0.5 26  0.1 3  1.4 95
-40 to -30 1.1 29 1.2 32 0.6 14 2.1 138 1.4 156  1.0 61  1.0 51  1.2 43 0.7 57  1.1 28  0.1 9 0.4 22  0.1 7  1.8 125
-30 to -20 1.6 47 1.2 36 0.8 21 2.2 154 2.1 237  0.8 79  1.0 55  2.5 90 0.8 68  1.9 50  0.2 15 0.6 36  0.3 20  1.7 116
-20 to -10 2.8 81 2.5 63 1.0 32 3.5 255 3.9 427  1.8 164  2.6 140  4.6 179 1.8 140  3.5 83  0.9 38 1.1 78  0.6 34  2.2 149
-10 to 0 3.2 96 3.5 92 1.6 44 4.7 391 6.2 685  3.1 243  7.9 399  6.3 259 4.2 359  6.2 159  2.1 92 3.7 155  3.0 194  3.6 250
0 0.8 17 6.3 144 0.1 4 0.0 1 0.0 1  1.4 82  2.5 147  19.5 601 1.0 70  0.0 0  0.2 11 14.5 828  18.7 1070  0.1 9
0 to 5 8.9 249 10.0 250 2.4 67 3.3 294 5.5 622  4.2 289  12.3 572  6.3 315 7.1 522  10.2 222  1.8 78 8.6 417  8.4 522  4.5 313
5 to 10 5.2 148 7.7 214 3.1 89 3.8 378 7.2 823  24.5 1425  9.4 497  7.2 382 6.8 556  16.2 383  4.6 204 10.1 486  14.0 893  7.6 541
10 to 15 9.9 302 6.7 195 3.6 115 5.3 518 10.6 1169  4.1 369  8.4 475  12.0 571 9.7 803  15.7 423  11.0 515 15.8 785  17.9 1089  9.8 694
15 to 20 12.5 342 8.9 244 6.3 192 7.7 794 14.0 1594  6.2 529  14.3 765  12.2 578 15.7 1293  13.0 362  10.5 480 18.6 881  17.2 1078  14.7 1048
20 to 25 15.0 417 9.0 275 7.9 265 11.5 1238 16.7 1935  7.0 644  11.3 616  7.9 341 17.3 1424  10.9 291  13.7 675 11.0 494  13.1 805  21.3 1434
25 to 30 16.3 412 10.4 313 9.0 326 15.6 1717 17.4 1985  7.2 744  8.4 433  6.0 230 16.5 1375  8.1 202  22.0 995 6.0 227  3.8 230  10.3 631
30 to 35 11.2 262 10.0 305 12.5 421 14.4 1652 5.9 643  9.3 915  7.3 382  4.3 146 9.4 764  5.4 139  17.5 787 4.9 154  1.2 65  1.3 83
35 to 40 5.3 118 7.4 244 19.2 632 7.1 983 1.2 129  10.5 911  4.1 201  1.3 42 4.2 335  2.7 65  4.2 186 1.1 36  0.5 32  0.2 14
40 to 45 1.5 30 3.7 121 19.1 619 2.6 418 0.2 26  7.4 500  1.3 64  0.1 3 1.4 112  1.2 30  1.6 68 0.1 3  0.3 20  0.0 0
45 to 50 0.7 8 1.0 31 5.8 180 0.7 144 0.0 5  2.2 110  0.2 13  0.0 0 0.2 19  0.3 7  0.6 27 0.0 0  0.1 6  0.0 0
>50 0.0 0 2.6 67 2.7 82 0.4 88 0.1 5  0.2 9  0.2 11  0.0 0 0.4 30  0.0 0  0.4 18 0.1 5  0.1 5  0.0 2




Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. To avoid difficult to interpret ‘distortions’ due to highly negative 
AETRs by net benefit recipients, standard deviations have only been computed for those observations with AETR values between +/- 100%. See text for further explanations. Modal 
values are shown in bold typeface.   22
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Household AETRs: by Quintile Groups (Household Disposable Incomes)                   
   AT BE  DK 
Quintile 
Group 
<1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> 
median [%]  3.7  13.4 20.3 24.9 31.5  0.0  4.9  16.9 26.2 34.1 19.0 27.0 35.5 39.1 43.3 
mean 































































<=-100 5.8 46 1.0 3 0.0 0 0.1 1 0.0 0 19.5 115 4.0 21 1.7 6 0.6 4 0.8 4  10.1 67 1.2 6 0.4 2  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-100 to -50 5.7 31 2.0 7 3.0 8 0.4 2 0.2 1 3.5 20 0.8 7 1.2 5 1.4 7 0.5 2  2.5 20 1.0 6 0.2 1  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-50 to -40 1.0 8 0.9 5 0.3 1 0.5 2 0.1 1 1.5 9 0.6 5 0.1 1 0.0 0 0.4 2  1.1 8 0.4 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-40 to -30 1.6 12 2.9 13 0.5 3 0.4 1 0.0 0 4.0 23 0.7 4 0.5 2 0.1 1 0.4 2  1.3 8 0.9 4 0.4 2  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-30 to -20 3.7 30 3.4 13 0.8 4 0.0 0 0.0 0 2.4 16 1.6 11 0.8 4 0.8 3 0.3 2  1.9 13 1.6 8 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-20 to -10 6.2 39 5.0 28 2.0 10 0.6 4 0.0 0 5.8 30 2.8 18 2.1 10 0.6 2 0.6 3  1.8 15 1.9 12 1.0 5  0.0 0  0.0 0 
-10 to 0 7.1 40 5.2 37 1.7 11 1.4 6 0.3 2 8.6 43 4.0 26 2.6 15 1.2 7 0.3 1  1.0 9 5.3 29 1.4 6  0.0 0  0.0 0 
0 2.7 15 0.3 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.6 1 10.1 53 16.3 80 2.0 9 0.0 0 0.4 2  0.3 3 0.1 1 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
0 to 5 32.6 199 5.1 28 1.7 9 1.8 11 0.6 2 16.7 91 19.8 109 6.9 33 2.2 11 1.1 6  1.7 14 7.4 44 2.2 8  0.2 1  0.0 0 
5 to 10 11.2 67 8.9 52 2.9 16 1.8 10 0.8 3 6.7 36 11.0 72 12.8 71 5.9 27 1.7 8  5.7 44 6.3 36 1.9 9  0.0 0  0.0 0 
10 to 15 11.0 86 20.9 103 12.6 73 4.7 30 1.8 10 3.3 20 9.1 61 13.4 74 5.1 27 2.7 13  9.7 79 4.5 30 0.7 5  0.2 1  0.0 0 
15 to 20 7.1 42 20.8 97 22.5 123 11.5 60 3.1 20 4.8 25 10.3 57 16.4 87 10.8 54 3.0 21  16.8 137 7.2 44 1.8 9  0.4 2  0.0 0 
20 to 25 2.7 14 16.9 81 19.7 110 27.5 156 10.8 56 2.2 13 7.9 54 13.4 78 17.0 91 6.4 39  18.8 178 8.1 52 5.7 25  1.7 8  0.3 2 
25 to 30 1.5 9 3.6 24 25.9 105 29.6 150 22.0 124 1.7 10 5.3 34 12.3 66 24.0 125 12.1 78  16.6 171 14.3 95 5.9 37  3.7 21  0.3 2 
30 to 35 0.1 3 1.9 12 3.6 16 13.7 61 34.5 170 1.2 6 2.3 16 6.7 35 18.8 102 24.1 146  5.4 50 22.1 156 23.8 140  11.2 60  2.5 15 
35 to 40 0.1 1 0.6 2 1.8 9 3.2 16 19.0 90 0.5 4 1.5 12 4.1 23 7.2 38 25.7 167  3.5 29 10.3 74 32.7 179  41.4 242  18.2 108 
40 to 45 0.0 0 0.4 1 0.7 4 0.8 3 5.2 22 0.2 2 1.1 7 1.0 7 2.8 15 14.1 90  1.1 8 6.5 41 19.9 110  34.4 191  43.4 269 
45 to 50 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 2.1 2 1.2 6 0.0 0 0.1 1 1.0 6 0.1 1 3.8 23  0.0 0 0.5 3 1.8 8  6.2 33  23.1 136 
>50 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 7.3 40 0.8 4 1.3 7 1.5 7 1.5 9  0.8 7 0.3 2 0.2 1  0.7 3  12.1 69 




Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. Modal values are shown in bold typeface.   23
 
 
Table 2. (continued)                                           
   FI FR  GE 
Quintile 
Group 
<1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> 
median  [%]  -26.1 13.1 23.9 28.6 34.0 -7.3 11.2 17.1 22.4 26.9 -1.3  7.7  19.7 31.6 32.9 































































<=-100 27.6 371  6.4 66 1.4 19  0.8 9  0.3 9  13.6 297  1.6 36 1.7 36 0.3 7  0.6 13  23.1 316  5.0 71  0.8 10 0.2 4 0.5 5 
-100 to -50 12.2 188  6.1 64 1.1 16  0.3 5  0.3 6  9.6 216  2.6 64 1.2 28 1.0 22  0.7 15  7.2 117  1.6 34  0.2 2 0.0 1 0.3 2 
-50 to -40 3.3 51  2.4 33 0.6 7  0.1 3  0.0 0  2.8 61  1.5 30 0.6 15 0.4 8  0.0 1  2.0 25  0.3 8  0.6 4 0.2 2 0.1 2 
-40 to -30 4.8 74  3.4 44 0.8 13  0.3 5  0.1 2  3.8 87  1.2 27 0.7 17 0.5 10  0.6 15  2.7 38  1.6 16  0.4 2 0.1 1 0.3 4 
-30 to -20 5.7 89  2.5 45 0.8 14  0.1 2  0.2 4  5.3 120  2.0 47 1.7 38 0.8 15  0.9 17  2.1 51  1.3 19  0.1 2 0.1 2 0.4 5 
-20 to -10 7.2 118  4.7 81 2.7 35  0.7 16  0.4 5  11.0 230  4.4 107 1.8 40 1.3 28  1.0 22  4.9 94  2.4 42  0.9 19 0.2 4 0.2 5 
-10 to 0 7.8 146  8.4 131 4.2 84  1.0 23  0.2 7  12.4 259  11.3 258 3.5 81 1.9 41  1.9 46  8.5 146  4.1 67  0.9 15 0.9 10 0.2 5 
0 0.1 1  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  3.1 44  2.0 15  1.4 15 0.4 6 0.2 2 
0 to 5 4.5 84  5.0 89 3.8 72  1.8 34  0.7 15  11.3 244  9.7 222 4.3 101 1.5 33  0.9 22  9.3 123  4.2 63  3.2 53 2.5 34 1.3 16 
5 to 10 4.2 89  5.9 111 5.1 95  2.8 58  0.8 25  9.6 219  12.7 288 8.6 196 3.4 77  1.7 43  25.0 297  36.4 412  32.3 371 20.3 237 10.3 108 
10 to 15 5.0 103  8.4 152 6.9 126  4.1 95  1.8 42  7.1 156  17.2 385 16.7 352 9.3 208  2.9 68  3.6 83  3.3 86  5.8 75 4.5 78 3.4 47 
15 to 20 8.4 147  9.1 189 10.4 210  7.6 161  2.8 87  5.9 131  14.4 339 21.0 472 19.1 425  10.0 227  3.3 81  11.5 174  3.3 70 5.9 110 7.6 94 
20 to 25 6.4 134  16.1 297 17.2 338  13.2 286  6.9 183  4.8 115  14.1 329 20.8 471 24.8 573  19.2 447  3.2 58  10.1 219  5.2 116 6.1 112 11.0 139 
25 to 30 1.3 61  17.0 273 26.6 486  26.4 535  13.5 362  2.1 48  6.9 151 15.7 344 30.6 680  31.2 762  1.8 31  8.9 190  10.0 241 5.9 121 10.0 161 
30 to 35 0.7 29  3.2 83 15.9 249  29.4 564  29.8 727  0.3 7  0.5 12 1.7 32 4.7 95  21.4 497  0.2 5  5.6 112  16.5 331 15.9 284 9.5 183 
35 to 40 0.4 20  0.8 29 1.7 62  9.5 180  26.2 692  0.2 5  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.2 4  5.2 120  0.1 1  1.7 30  16.1 200 20.8 426 14.6 254 
40 to 45 0.3 10  0.2 11 0.5 28  1.0 28  11.9 341  0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1  1.1 24  0.0 0  0.1 3  2.2 21 15.3 180 19.4 296 
45 to 50 0.1 4  0.2 10 0.2 9  0.4 22  2.7 99  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.2 5  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 1 0.8 6 9.7 103 
>50 0.0 2  0.1 4 0.1 6  0.5 15  1.4 61  0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.3 4  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 1.0 9 
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Table 2. (continued)                                           
   GR IR IT 
Quintile 
Group 
<1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> 
median  [%]  -6.2  5.0  12.9 18.6 26.3  0.0  0.0  9.8  16.1 24.9  3.5  13.1 19.7 23.7 28.7 































































<=-100 26.1 290  0.2 2 0.1 1  0.0 0  0.1 1  18.0 101  7.8 50 1.5 7 0.0 0  0.0 0  3.4 51  0.5 12  0.3 4 0.2 3 0.1 1 
-100 to -50 5.4 72  0.2 2 0.3 2  0.1 1  0.0 0  1.2 12  5.5 41 1.6 11 0.2 1  0.0 0  3.6 53  1.2 16  1.0 12 0.5 6 0.2 3 
-50 to -40 1.5 20  0.2 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.8 9  3.1 31 1.0 5 0.0 0  0.0 0  2.3 28  0.6 15  0.2 3 0.0 0 0.1 1 
-40 to -30 3.0 34  1.4 16 0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.3 10  3.0 20 1.5 13 0.0 0  0.0 0  2.4 36  0.8 14  0.2 5 0.2 1 0.1 1 
-30 to -20 2.3 27  2.1 21 0.3 4  0.3 3  0.0 0  6.5 44  2.8 24 0.8 10 1.2 8  0.3 4  2.9 40  0.7 16  0.5 10 0.0 1 0.0 1 
-20 to -10 7.2 90  4.0 38 0.7 9  0.3 3  0.0 0  12.2 97  4.5 40 3.6 30 0.5 6  1.2 6  6.0 82  1.5 29  0.7 13 0.8 11 0.2 5 
-10 to 0 11.3 131  20.6 199 5.4 55  1.4 14  0.0 0  8.6 70  11.9 98 7.0 57 2.8 26  0.9 8  11.1 180  7.7 123  1.6 32 1.0 18 0.2 6 
0 8.4 112  1.9 23 1.1 12  0.0 0  0.0 0  48.3 290  38.2 284 3.1 22 0.1 1  0.7 4  4.8 68  0.1 2  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
0 to 5 10.0 117  19.8 181 22.6 179  9.0 82  1.1 13  2.7 24  11.6 94 12.3 115 5.8 68  1.2 14  23.3 320  9.6 150  1.2 19 1.1 20 0.9 13 
5 to 10 3.0 49  9.7 111 14.3 140  14.7 133  6.7 64  0.2 4  6.9 56 18.8 152 10.0 110  3.5 60  11.6 190  15.6 243  5.1 77 1.6 26 0.9 20 
10 to 15 2.7 45  9.0 100 11.6 122  11.8 126  8.3 82  0.1 1  4.2 33 31.5 216 22.2 204  8.3 117  6.7 106  19.5 300  12.7 224 5.6 95 4.4 78 
15 to 20 9.1 123  15.6 152 17.1 179  18.7 187  12.1 124  0.1 1  0.4 4 15.5 106 34.4 282  14.7 185  6.3 107  18.6 297  27.4 448 17.5 271 9.0 170 
20 to 25 3.5 49  8.6 95 11.3 122  16.9 165  17.5 185  0.0 0  0.1 1 1.7 11 18.2 130  19.6 199  6.6 107  10.4 164  22.5 386 29.7 456 16.8 311 
25 to 30 2.4 33  5.4 49 9.4 93  10.3 97  15.5 161  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 2 4.5 32  23.7 196  4.6 80  7.9 125  17.2 287 27.7 447 24.4 436 
30 to 35 1.4 19  1.0 10 4.5 44  10.3 100  20.0 209  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 1 0.3 2  19.4 143  1.7 34  3.8 58  7.1 116 10.2 168 23.4 388 
35 to 40 1.0 13  0.2 3 0.4 4  4.7 43  14.4 138  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  6.2 42  0.6 13  1.1 21  1.8 36 3.2 53 13.7 212 
40 to 45 0.8 11  0.1 2 0.7 6  1.1 10  3.5 35  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.4 3  0.4 7  0.1 3  0.4 7 0.7 13 5.1 82 
45 to 50 0.2 3  0.0 0 0.2 2  0.1 1  0.7 7  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.1 2 0.0 1 0.6 13 
>50 0.6 10  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.2 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.6 21  0.2 3  0.0 1 0.0 0 0.2 5 
   100.0 1248  100.0 1006 100.0 975  100.0 966  100.0 1019  100.0 663  100.0 776 100.0 758 100.0 870  100.0 981  100.0 1526  100.0 1591  100.0 1682 100.0 1590 100.0 1746   25
 
Table 2. (continued)                                           
   LU NL PT 
Quintile 
Group 
<1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> 
median  [%]  0.5  6.6  10.8 17.9 28.3  7.6  16.6 25.0 28.5 31.6  0.0  7.3  13.3 16.6 25.0 































































<=-100 6.6 28  0.3 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  26.5 250  4.5 42 0.5 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  7.7 116  1.5 4  0.0 0 0.4 2 0.0 1 
-100 to -50 6.2 33  1.4 7 0.2 2  0.0 0  0.0 0  4.7 48  0.7 8 0.3 1 0.0 0  0.0 0  2.8 41  0.1 2  0.2 3 0.1 1 0.3 3 
-50 to -40 3.3 17  1.0 6 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.3 15  0.4 3 0.1 1 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.5 23  0.1 2  0.5 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 
-40 to -30 3.2 14  2.3 11 0.3 3  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.6 8  0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.0 17  0.1 1  0.2 1 0.2 2 0.2 1 
-30 to -20 5.5 25  2.6 16 1.3 7  0.1 1  0.1 1  0.8 11  0.4 4 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  2.3 31  0.5 4  0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 
-20 to -10 9.0 33  3.6 22 4.0 21  1.5 7  0.0 0  2.5 25  1.5 13 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  4.3 70  0.6 5  0.1 1 0.0 1 0.1 1 
-10 to 0 14.5 64  8.0 39 7.0 43  2.1 11  0.4 2  4.3 49  5.5 38 0.2 3 0.2 1  0.1 1  9.4 108  4.6 23  2.0 14 1.2 10 0.0 0 
0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.0 10  0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  35.8 534  19.7 188  9.8 71 3.8 34 0.1 1 
0 to 5 18.1 70  23.6 100 6.8 31  3.8 20  0.1 1  4.3 47  3.1 23 1.3 5 0.2 2  0.1 1  9.9 147  14.1 119  7.5 59 8.9 66 3.0 26 
5 to 10 17.4 79  33.5 163 24.2 107  5.5 28  1.3 6  8.7 84  8.8 70 5.0 45 0.2 1  0.3 4  4.9 96  20.9 180  12.4 115 8.6 59 5.4 36 
10 to 15 12.6 84  11.9 67 36.9 179  16.4 85  1.2 8  21.0 216  13.9 123 5.9 55 10.7 96  2.3 25  7.1 82  21.3 220  31.9 305 15.2 121 7.1 57 
15 to 20 2.0 9  9.2 58 11.2 77  34.6 177  7.7 41  12.2 122  20.9 188 13.9 110 2.7 26  3.5 34  5.6 62  12.6 118  28.8 251 38.3 351 10.8 99 
20 to 25 1.1 6  2.3 13 6.4 34  21.1 113  22.3 125  7.2 75  19.4 204 22.6 196 13.3 116  8.3 84  3.1 42  3.5 37  6.1 61 19.6 201 22.9 153 
25 to 30 0.2 1  0.2 1 1.3 8  12.6 60  24.5 132  4.0 38  17.2 145 32.9 254 37.0 321  23.1 237  1.9 28  0.5 6  0.6 7 3.6 23 22.8 163 
30 to 35 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 1  1.4 8  23.8 130  0.4 6  3.4 27 15.7 120 32.2 270  36.3 364  1.3 18  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 1 22.6 135 
35 to 40 0.3 1  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.4 2  12.2 62  0.1 2  0.2 2 1.4 10 3.0 26  15.2 146  0.8 9  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 4.3 27 
40 to 45 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 1  0.5 3  5.1 26  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 1  7.1 67  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.5 2 
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.4 7  0.1 1  0.0 0 0.1 1 0.3 3  2.2 22  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
>50 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.3 3  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  1.4 15  0.4 5  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
   100.0 464  100.0 505 100.0 514  100.0 515  100.0 541  100.0 1010  100.0 892 100.0 803 100.0 863  100.0 1000  100.0 1430  100.0 909  100.0 890 100.0 872 100.0 705 
   26
 
Table 2. (continued)                            
   SP UK 
Quintile 
Group 
<1> <2> <3> <4> <5> <1> <2> <3> <4> <5> 
median  [%]  0.0  3.5  10.0 14.9 20.6 -47.6 -2.5 14.5 20.2 24.5 











































<=-100 2.1 30  0.2 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  43.6 586  17.5 249 9.1 115 3.5 40  0.1 1 
-100 to -50 1.1 10  0.1 1 0.1 1  0.2 2  0.0 0  5.7 75  12.8 183 3.2 40 0.3 4  0.0 0 
-50 to -40 0.2 2  0.1 1 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.8 24  4.0 57 1.0 12 0.1 1  0.1 1 
-40 to -30 0.4 5  0.1 1 0.0 0  0.1 1  0.0 0  4.0 55  4.0 57 0.6 8 0.4 5  0.0 0 
-30 to -20 1.5 17  0.1 3 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  2.5 31  4.1 60 1.6 21 0.3 4  0.0 0 
-20 to -10 1.9 22  0.6 6 0.2 4  0.2 1  0.1 1  5.2 71  3.6 52 1.6 20 0.4 5  0.1 1 
-10 to 0 12.6 158  1.7 21 0.6 9  0.5 6  0.0 0  7.4 106  5.2 75 3.7 44 1.7 22  0.2 3 
0 37.7 422  36.9 475 16.2 167  0.7 6  0.0 0  0.7 8  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 1  0.0 0 
0 to 5 15.3 184  15.6 217 8.3 95  1.9 26  0.0 0  12.3 170  4.6 66 3.8 49 1.3 17  0.7 11 
5 to 10 11.8 152  19.3 276 24.8 303  12.4 145  1.2 17  10.2 143  14.9 228 8.3 111 4.0 54  0.3 5 
10 to 15 4.0 42  13.3 186 26.3 312  34.6 398  12.2 151  3.9 54  15.3 236 19.3 258 8.1 111  2.5 35 
15 to 20 3.1 38  5.8 83 15.1 182  30.9 372  31.9 403  1.5 21  8.2 132 26.6 366 28.4 385  10.2 144 
20 to 25 2.9 34  5.5 73 7.5 91  16.3 184  33.1 423  0.9 12  5.2 72 18.6 238 39.6 516  42.8 596 
25 to 30 2.4 23  0.5 9 0.5 7  2.0 27  13.6 164  0.1 1  0.5 7 2.6 30 11.7 129  35.9 464 
30 to 35 1.0 13  0.1 1 0.2 2  0.0 0  4.9 49  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.2 2  6.2 81 
35 to 40 0.6 10  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  2.0 22  0.1 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.9 13 
40 to 45 0.8 11  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.8 9  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 
45 to 50 0.5 5  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 
>50 0.3 4  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 1  0.1 2  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 
   100.0 1182  100.0 1355 100.0 1173  100.0 1168  100.0 1241  100.0 1360  100.0 1474 100.0 1312 100.0 1296  100.0 1355   27
 
Table 3. Distribution of Household AETRs: by Status of Head of Household                 
   AT BE DK  FI  FR  GE  GR 
   "active"  retired  "active"  retired  "active"  retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired 
median [%] 
24.5  10.9  26.3 5.1 38.7  18.6 27.4  0.0  22.6 12.5 29.8  7.5  20.5  2.4 
mean 
[%] 



























































<=-100 0.6 16 0.6 3  3.5 46  4.2 37  0.4 8  0.6 4 0.7 51  18.2 212  1.0 74  1.4 33  1.8 78  1.4 26  0.0 2  20.8 247 
-100 to -50 1.0 18 4.0 20  1.2 18  1.0 9  0.2 4  0.3 2 1.0 65  9.8 123  1.9 145  1.4 37  0.9 62  2.3 31  0.3 13  3.8 51 
-50 to -40 0.2 6 1.2 10  0.3 4  0.2 3  0.0 0  0.5 2 0.4 27  3.0 44  0.6 46  0.9 22  0.4 21  0.9 7  0.2 9  0.9 11 
-40 to -30 0.4 10 1.8 15  0.6 8  0.8 6  0.3 3  0.1 1 0.7 50  3.4 44  0.9 64  1.4 39  0.6 22  1.4 22  0.2 10  2.3 29 
-30 to -20 1.5 29 1.8 14  1.2 18  0.7 7  0.2 4  0.9 5 1.0 67  3.6 49  1.3 101  2.0 49  0.6 38  0.6 14  0.3 14  2.6 30 
-20 to -10 2.6 54 3.3 23  1.4 20  2.6 17  0.3 7  1.3 9 1.8 123  5.8 82  2.5 192  4.5 115  1.1 75  1.7 36  0.6 26  5.3 69 
-10 to 0 2.9 63 3.4 27  3.0 47  4.0 30  0.6 11  4.2 26 3.1 214  6.2 101  4.7 344  7.2 181  1.4 104  4.9 81  2.1 82  11.5 134 
0 0.0 0 0.1 1  0.1 1  15.4 116  0.0 0  0.1 2 0.0 0  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.4 9  1.2 19  0.1 4  0.2 3 
0 to 5 3.3 67 21.6 169  2.9 42  20.7 172  0.6 10  6.8 45 2.8 190  3.7 61  3.5 268  9.5 248  1.6 95  9.0 150  3.9 146  27.1 267 
5 to 10 3.7 76 8.9 69  3.7 60  13.6 125  0.5 10  10.2 69 3.8 268  3.8 71  5.1 388  12.5 327  4.0 203  70.2 1174  5.9 238  16.4 171 
10 to 15 6.6 142 17.8 150  5.9 99  8.8 81  0.6 17  12.1 88 5.1 367  5.4 101  7.0 514  20.7 531  5.1 302  3.2 50  11.3 400  4.9 53 
15 to 20 11.0 207 16.9 129  10.6 167  8.5 69  1.6 32  18.2 136 7.9 582  7.2 134  12.5 928  21.7 562  9.3 484  1.9 27  22.2 726  2.2 23 
20 to 25 17.6 337 10.4 72  12.3 212  5.6 50  4.0 84  19.5 162 12.9 927  10.0 220  21.2 1556  12.7 317  11.4 624  0.7 13  18.0 595  0.6 9 
25 to 30 21.8 370 5.7 38  15.1 254  5.4 49  5.6 115  17.4 173 20.5 1411  10.8 242  26.3 1858  3.5 90  11.7 728  0.4 2  13.5 422  0.5 5 
30 to 35 15.9 249 2.1 12  16.0 273  2.8 24  14.8 312  5.3 45 21.5 1482  5.9 153  9.2 620  0.5 14  15.5 905  0.1 2  11.7 371  0.7 8 
35 to 40 7.7 114 0.4 4  12.5 227  1.4 14  28.4 596  1.6 11 11.1 924  2.0 52  1.8 125  0.1 2  17.5 903  0.0 0  6.7 198  0.1 1 
40 to 45 2.2 29 0.1 1  6.0 110  1.0 10  29.2 610  0.5 4 3.9 394  1.0 21  0.4 25  0.0 1  12.4 497  0.2 1  2.1 64  0.0 0 
45 to 50 1.0 8 0.0 0  1.5 26  0.4 4  9.0 177  0.1 1 1.0 139  0.2 5  0.1 5  0.0 0  3.7 110  0.0 0  0.4 13  0.0 0 
>50 0.0 0 0.0 0  2.1 32  2.8 22  3.7 72  0.4 2 0.6 84  0.0 2  0.1 4  0.0 1  0.3 9  0.0 0  0.3 10  0.1 1 





Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. Modal values are shown in bold typeface.   28
 
Table 3. (continued)                            
   IR  IT LU NL PT SP UK 
   "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired "active" retired 
median [%] 
15.0 0.0 24.8  10.0  15.7 9.1 27.3  14.0  15.9 0.0 16.3 0.0 20.8 4.9 
mean 
[%] 



























































<=-100 1.6 36  1.2 8  0.1 7  2.1 51  0.2 4  0.4 3  2.7 66  1.5 14  1.8 62  0.3 7  0.0 1  0.1 1  3.1 134  7.9 119 
-100 to -50 0.9 21  1.4 8  0.3 25  2.4 50  1.2 23  1.1 7  0.8 25  0.1 1  0.7 29  0.5 15  0.2 4  0.0 1  1.5 62  9.8 151 
-50 to -40 0.7 19  2.0 13  0.5 12  0.7 27  0.9 18  0.5 3  0.3 10  0.0 0  0.5 17  0.3 5  0.1 2  0.1 1  0.5 20  3.3 52 
-40 to -30 0.7 23  0.7 4  0.6 26  0.7 23  1.3 23  0.6 3  0.2 6  0.0 0  0.3 14  0.1 2  0.1 3  0.1 1  0.8 31  4.2 67 
-30 to -20 1.4 40  0.4 3  0.4 29  1.2 29  2.3 44  0.7 3  0.3 10  0.0 0  0.6 21  0.7 10  0.1 5  0.2 2  0.7 30  3.7 59 
-20 to -10 2.5 71  1.1 5  1.3 60  2.3 60  3.7 64  3.4 15  0.7 23  0.3 4  0.7 42  1.8 23  0.4 14  0.3 3  1.3 53  4.5 70 
-10 to 0 5.8 169  2.4 15  2.4 134  7.7 208  7.2 131  3.4 17  1.3 42  3.7 34  2.3 86  5.0 43  1.6 53  1.8 31  2.9 114  6.1 98 
0 1.5 42  65.9 317  0.0 0  2.1 46  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 3  0.1 1  0.0 0  59.1 767  0.0 0  47.5 573  0.1 3  0.0 0 
0 to 5 7.5 249  6.4 33  2.2 127  16.8 367  6.5 110  19.1 93  0.8 25  4.3 40  5.2 192  18.9 199  4.3 171  12.3 155  2.2 89  10.6 169 
5 to 10 10.5 348  4.2 24  3.2 161  13.6 364  10.6 191  29.3 153  1.8 55  12.8 130  11.5 418  6.2 51  13.1 496  15.8 202  3.7 154  19.7 322 
10 to 15 17.0 526  7.7 30  6.2 315  16.0 445  14.0 285  19.0 103  3.2 105  34.5 376  20.0 726  4.3 36  23.3 817  12.5 164  8.4 352  17.8 288 
15 to 20 18.9 553  3.7 21  12.0 643  22.9 585  15.0 302  9.6 51  7.4 253  20.1 200  24.8 838  1.4 28  25.9 928  6.9 91  20.0 847  9.7 156 
20 to 25 12.4 327  1.4 8  22.3 1143  8.8 238  13.7 256  5.9 33  17.7 566  7.4 82  14.9 484  0.8 8  20.9 736  2.2 25  35.0 1382  2.4 39 
25 to 30 9.6 222  0.9 7  24.7 1279  1.9 69  10.4 181  3.6 19  29.1 861  8.2 75  8.2 217  0.4 6  6.2 215  0.2 2  17.2 622  0.2 4 
30 to 35 6.9 142  0.5 4  14.6 741  0.5 19  7.1 128  2.0 11  24.6 716  3.9 42  6.6 150  0.1 2  2.1 63  0.1 1  2.2 81  0.1 1 
35 to 40 2.1 40  0.3 2  6.6 329  0.1 5  3.9 63  0.3 2  5.4 159  2.2 18  1.5 35  0.0 1  0.9 32  0.0 0  0.3 14  0.0 0 
40 to 45 0.1 3  0.0 0  2.1 110  0.0 0  1.5 26  0.9 4  2.2 61  0.4 5  0.2 3  0.0 0  0.5 18  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 17  0.0 1  0.4 6  0.1 1  0.7 21  0.4 4  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 6  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
>50 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.4 17  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.4 14  0.2 2  0.1 5  0.0 0  0.0 2  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 0 
   100.0 2831  100.0 502  100.0 5175  100.0 2587  100.0 1855  100.0 521  100.0 3021  100.0 1028  100.0 3339  100.0 1203  100.0 3566  100.0 1253  100.0 3989  100.0 1595 
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Table 4. Distribution of Household AETRs: by Age of Head of Household                             
   AT BE  DK  FI 
   <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65 
median 
[%] 
16.5  21.9  24.5  10.3 9.0 22.9 21.8  4.7  27.1 36.1 38.0 20.7  -14.6 21.5 26.7 -3.0 
mean 
[%] 



































































<=-100 1.4 3  1.8 20  1.2 20  1.5 7 15.7 8 5.1 38 6.6 68 4.6 36  18.5 37  3.5 27  1.0 11  0.0 0 26.3 118 5.4 98  3.6 105  18.9 153 
-100 to -50 5.3 5  1.8 16  1.4 14  3.9 14 2.2 2 1.3 11 2.2 23 0.8 5  4.7 11  1.4 13  0.2 2  0.1 1 12.4 60 2.7 59  1.7 59  11.1 101 
-50 to -40 0.2 1  0.3 4  0.6 8  1.0 4 0.0 0 0.6 6 0.9 10 0.1 1  1.9 5  0.3 3  0.3 2  0.0 0 2.3 13 1.4 30  0.4 16  3.4 35 
-40 to -30 1.4 2  0.8 7  0.5 6  2.5 14 0.0 0 1.6 13 1.3 14 0.8 5  3.1 6  1.1 7  0.0 0  0.1 1 3.3 16 2.0 45  1.4 46  3.4 31 
-30 to -20 2.6 7  2.1 15  1.1 15  1.7 10 2.5 1 1.4 11 1.4 19 0.7 5  2.2 5  0.7 6  1.1 10  0.0 0 3.7 18 2.2 52  1.2 49  3.6 35 
-20 to -10 2.0 5  3.2 32  2.2 26  3.4 18 5.5 2 3.1 26 2.0 20 2.4 15  2.3 7  1.4 13  0.5 7  1.0 5 4.7 24 2.8 76  2.5 95  5.9 60 
-10 to 0 3.8 6  4.5 39  2.3 32  2.9 19 4.3 3 4.6 37 2.8 32 3.5 20  1.7 5  1.8 15  0.5 5  3.4 19 5.4 28 5.7 154  3.3 137  6.1 72 
0 5.9 5  0.2 2  1.0 9  0.1 1 0.0 0 1.1 5 3.3 38 16.6 101  0.0 0  0.1 1  0.1 1  0.2 2 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.1 1  0.0 0 
0 to 5 4.6 7  3.9 37  5.2 68  22.9 137 7.3 3 3.4 30 6.7 67 21.9 150  2.0 6  1.9 14  1.9 21  4.3 26 5.6 25 3.5 107  2.6 120  3.7 42 
5 to 10 6.6 9  3.8 36  3.8 54  9.1 49 12.1 4 4.0 38 6.2 70 13.4 102  0.6 2  1.2 10  2.1 26  8.9 51 3.3 20 5.3 170  2.8 138  4.3 50 
10 to 15 11.7 17  7.9 73  7.1 100  17.3 112 7.7 5 5.9 52 6.0 73 8.4 65  1.0 4  1.4 17  1.4 16  12.3 78 3.8 22 6.2 203  5.0 224  4.9 69 
15 to 20 14.6 22  13.3 102  10.0 134  15.7 84 12.2 7 10.8 96 7.5 85 8.8 56  3.7 9  2.7 25  4.2 53  16.5 105 6.0 39 9.0 291  7.4 371  7.2 93 
20 to 25 17.7 35  18.8 155  15.3 179  8.9 48 7.1 4 12.2 120 9.6 115 4.9 36  5.2 14  4.8 47  4.5 59  20.4 145 7.2 49 12.6 380  12.3 656  9.9 153 
25 to 30 11.6 27  19.7 135  20.1 218  6.0 32 8.5 4 14.9 134 11.0 137 5.0 38  9.2 22  6.1 62  5.9 78  19.3 164 11.1 61 16.5 459  18.8 1055  9.3 142 
30 to 35 10.4 11  11.3 74  16.0 167  2.4 10 6.3 4 13.3 121 12.9 161 2.5 19  9.3 27  15.7 165  13.6 177  6.8 52 3.8 27 15.0 444  20.2 1097  5.0 84 
35 to 40 0.2 1  4.6 30  8.8 83  0.5 4 3.0 3 11.1 105 9.5 128 1.0 8  16.6 44  25.6 261  23.3 307  2.9 20 0.6 4 6.9 219  10.8 724  1.9 36 
40 to 45 0.0 0  1.6 11  2.3 18  0.1 1 1.4 1 2.7 28 6.3 83 1.1 9  13.3 32  22.1 214  26.4 356  2.6 17 0.3 3 2.0 82  4.1 319  1.1 14 
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.5 3  1.2 5  0.0 0 0.7 1 1.2 10 1.3 18 0.3 2  2.3 5  6.4 60  8.6 109  0.9 6 0.1 2 0.4 21  1.1 115  0.3 6 
>50 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 3.5 1 1.9 18 2.7 29 3.1 19  2.5 5  2.1 22  4.4 53  0.3 2 0.1 1 0.2 19  0.7 65  0.0 3 




Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. Modal values are shown in bold typeface.   30
 
Table 4. (continued)                                             
   FR GE GR  IR 
   <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65 
median 
[%] 
1.8  19.6  21.3  11.2 5.9 27.2  24.0 7.5  0.8 19.5  18.6 -1.7 5.1 13.1  10.2 0.0 
mean 
[%] 



































































<=-100 10.0 57  3.9 127  3.2 150 2.3 55 22.6 68  8.6 187  6.4 131  1.5 20  2.4 4 0.7 7 1.7 33  18.9 250  11.4 15  7.7 57  6.3 76 1.1 10
-100 to -50 6.1 36  3.1 109  2.6 126 2.9 74 8.4 26  2.1 67  1.5 46  1.8 17  2.1 3 0.3 5 0.6 15  3.6 54  3.3 10  0.8 10  2.0 30 1.8 15
-50 to -40 2.3 11  0.9 31  0.8 38 1.4 35 4.7 8  0.5 14  0.2 13  1.0 6  0.4 1 0.2 3 0.2 7  0.8 11  1.7 5  1.1 14  0.6 12 1.3 14
-40 to -30 3.5 21  1.2 39  1.2 57 1.5 39 4.3 9  0.8 18  0.8 19  1.2 15  0.0 0 0.3 3 0.4 11  2.7 37  2.4 7  0.7 11  1.7 22 0.5 3
-30 to -20 7.9 44  1.7 62  1.6 71 2.4 60 2.6 9  1.3 42  0.5 18  0.6 10  0.5 1 0.6 7 0.5 16  2.4 31  3.2 11  3.3 35  2.7 41 0.5 3
-20 to -10 8.7 48  3.1 109  3.0 140 5.3 130 1.0 5  2.4 70  1.6 62  1.6 27  0.7 1 1.1 15 1.4 38  6.2 86  6.0 18  7.6 85  4.1 67 0.9 9
-10 to 0 10.4 55  6.0 204  4.4 212 8.7 214 2.6 12  2.7 91  2.4 80  4.6 60  14.7 28 3.4 50 5.1 119  16.1 202  9.0 30  7.3 82  7.6 131 1.3 16
0 0.2 1  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 1.5 6  0.3 11  2.3 49  1.4 16  24.7 45 2.1 37 2.0 53  0.9 12  3.7 8  1.9 17  9.0 108 70.4 468
0 to 5 3.4 19  4.2 150  3.7 185 10.5 268 2.2 10  2.2 62  3.1 110  8.6 107  13.2 25 5.0 77 9.8 203  23.6 267  8.3 32  4.3 65  7.5 161 6.6 57
5 to 10 6.6 41  6.1 217  5.3 264 11.8 301 3.0 12  4.7 110  11.5 367  71.2 936  6.1 10 5.4 84 9.0 231  14.4 172  11.0 36  6.8 105  8.3 194 4.4 47
10 to 15 5.7 34  7.8 272  7.9 375 19.4 488 5.5 18  4.7 138  4.3 176  2.9 37  8.5 22 11.8 181 9.3 222  3.7 50  13.5 46  14.1 211  13.0 269 6.6 45
15 to 20 8.2 50  13.5 472  12.4 606 18.4 466 8.4 34  6.5 185  8.6 288  1.8 22  15.1 31 22.4 302 16.2 393  2.9 39  13.7 45  17.5 245  13.0 271 2.2 17
20 to 25 12.8 72  18.6 648  19.3 941 11.1 274 8.6 34  9.7 273  8.8 322  1.0 15  6.5 16 19.2 262 12.9 314  1.4 24  8.4 24  9.6 123  10.0 182 1.3 12
25 to 30 12.9 80  22.0 723  23.0 1094 3.5 88 8.5 31  8.3 292  10.4 418  0.5 3  2.9 7 11.4 164 11.7 251  0.8 11  2.7 5  9.4 107  6.8 111 0.5 7
30 to 35 1.5 9  6.6 201  9.1 418 0.6 15 6.3 28  13.9 388  11.9 497  0.1 2  1.8 4 10.6 140 9.5 220  1.1 18  1.6 2  6.5 73  5.1 69 0.2 2
35 to 40 0.0 0  1.2 38  1.9 89 0.1 2 7.2 28  16.1 425  13.0 456  0.2 2  0.5 1 4.6 58 6.4 136  0.4 6  0.0 0  1.5 14  2.0 25 0.3 3
40 to 45 0.0 0  0.2 3  0.5 22 0.0 1 2.2 9  11.7 253  9.4 238  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.8 10 2.4 53  0.0 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 3 0.0 0
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.1 4 0.0 0 0.0 0  3.4 58  2.9 52  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 6 0.4 7  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0
>50 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 5 0.0 0 0.4 1  0.0 1  0.4 7  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4 10  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0
   100.0 578  100.0 3406  100.0 4797 100.0 2510 100.0 348  100.0 2685  100.0 3349  100.0 1295  100.0 199 100.0 1412 100.0 2332  100.0 1271  100.0 294  100.0 1254  100.0 1772 100.0 728  31
 
Table 4. (continued)                                                
   IT LU NL PT 
   <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65 
median 
[%] 
19.6  23.4 23.4 10.0 11.8 14.8 13.5  9.2 -56.3 26.7 27.2 13.2 12.1 15.1 15.8  0.0 
mean 
[%] 



































































<=-100 0.3 1  0.5 8  0.4 18 2.3 44 0.0 0  0.7 6  2.4 22  0.4 2  38.1 95 6.0 95 6.2 104  0.0 0  2.6 4  2.5 36  2.9 74 0.3 9
-100 to -50 0.5 2  0.8 21  0.8 23 2.7 44 0.8 1  2.1 21  1.6 18  0.5 2  13.2 36 0.6 13 0.4 6  0.2 2  0.2 1  0.4 10  1.1 24 0.8 15
-50 to -40 1.3 1  1.0 11  0.3 13 0.7 22 0.6 1  1.7 16  0.3 4  0.4 2  2.7 7 0.4 8 0.2 4  0.0 0  0.3 3  0.6 8  0.4 10 0.3 5
-40 to -30 0.1 1  0.7 16  0.8 27 0.6 13 0.5 1  2.0 16  1.0 10  0.2 1  1.0 4 0.1 3 0.1 2  0.0 0  0.3 1  0.3 5  0.5 13 0.2 3
-30 to -20 0.4 2  0.8 20  0.6 26 1.2 20 2.3 4  2.8 27  1.7 17  0.6 2  1.7 7 0.2 4 0.2 4  0.0 0  0.3 4  0.5 10  0.9 12 0.4 10
-20 to -10 1.1 3  1.6 35  1.9 68 1.9 34 3.5 6  4.9 42  2.6 25  3.3 10  2.7 7 0.8 11 0.8 15  0.5 5  1.5 2  0.9 18  1.1 36 1.4 22
-10 to 0 1.0 6  2.4 57  3.8 141 7.3 155 3.4 5  8.5 82  6.2 58  3.3 14  2.4 8 1.4 21 1.2 24  5.0 39  3.0 7  2.8 36  3.9 70 4.4 42
0 0.2 1  0.4 9  1.0 28 1.7 32 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.3 4 0.1 2 0.3 5  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 4  4.6 91 53.1 733
0 to 5 3.7 14  2.1 60  4.6 164 17.5 284 8.6 11  6.0 55  8.7 76  19.5 80  0.9 3 0.7 13 1.3 21  4.9 41  10.7 29  5.9 75  5.4 116 17.5 197
5 to 10 6.4 18  3.7 80  4.7 168 13.9 290 14.6 18  9.5 89  14.1 148  30.0 128  2.3 7 1.6 23 1.7 32  15.3 142  19.7 60  13.4 166  8.7 191 6.5 69
10 to 15 7.7 22  7.5 147  7.8 303 15.7 331 33.4 46  12.8 147  14.9 150  18.3 80  3.5 11 2.6 47 3.6 68  39.5 389  31.1 74  20.4 261  16.4 379 6.1 71
15 to 20 32.9 75  14.4 315  11.8 468 22.1 435 19.1 30  14.0 157  13.1 130  10.4 45  1.4 3 8.3 135 7.3 144  22.5 198  20.6 53  25.1 300  21.6 459 4.5 69
20 to 25 26.5 68  21.7 476  18.9 710 8.5 170 8.9 10  13.7 139  11.3 112  6.3 30  9.5 29 19.5 301 13.8 290  5.7 55  8.6 16  13.4 168  14.5 282 2.3 28
25 to 30 13.7 34  21.4 430  21.9 854 2.1 57 3.8 3  10.6 99  9.3 87  2.9 13  13.0 36 29.2 423 27.7 506  3.3 30  0.5 2  7.2 73  8.5 136 1.1 16
30 to 35 3.0 12  13.3 269  12.2 460 1.0 23 0.0 0  6.9 66  6.3 62  2.3 11  3.8 13 22.8 330 24.5 435  0.9 9  0.5 1  5.3 41  7.5 103 0.8 9
35 to 40 0.3 1  5.1 104  6.1 220 0.4 10 0.0 0  2.4 22  4.4 40  0.6 3  1.5 4 3.7 53 6.6 123  1.3 6  0.0 0  1.2 9  1.5 25 0.2 2
40 to 45 0.2 1  1.7 37  1.9 70 0.2 4 0.5 1  1.1 11  1.7 15  0.7 3  0.0 0 1.3 14 2.5 46  0.7 8  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.3 2 0.0 0
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.1 6  0.3 12 0.1 1 0.0 0  0.2 2  0.4 4  0.1 1  0.6 1 0.3 4 1.1 21  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0
>50 1.0 1  0.8 15  0.4 14 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.3 1 0.3 6 0.6 10  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 3 0.2 2
   100.0 263  100.0 2116  100.0 3787 100.0 1969 100.0 137  100.0 997  100.0 978  100.0 427  100.0 276 100.0 1506 100.0 1860  100.0 926  100.0 257  100.0 1221  100.0 2026 100.0 1302
   32
 
Table 4. (continued)                     
   SP UK 
   <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65  <25  25 to 39  40 to 64  >65 
median 
[%] 
8.3 14.6 14.5  0.0  1.6  19.4 17.8  4.7 
mean 
[%] 



































<=-100 0.9 1  0.5 11  0.4 16 0.4 4 31.3 125  19.2 413  12.9 337  7.6 116 
-100 to -50 0.0 0  0.3 3  0.4 9 0.1 2 4.4 15  2.5 52  2.6 69  10.6 166 
-50 to -40 0.0 0  0.2 2  0.0 0 0.0 1 1.6 6  0.5 10  1.1 29  3.1 50 
-40 to -30 0.3 1  0.1 1  0.1 4 0.1 1 1.9 7  0.8 18  1.3 36  4.0 64 
-30 to -20 0.4 1  0.4 5  0.3 11 0.2 3 2.0 7  0.8 16  1.1 26  4.1 67 
-20 to -10 0.7 3  0.9 11  0.7 16 0.2 4 1.6 6  1.3 27  1.4 39  4.9 77 
-10 to 0 1.9 3  4.3 62  2.8 83 2.2 46 4.4 15  3.0 65  2.6 69  6.2 101 
0 7.9 8  0.9 13  6.9 173 55.7 876 1.5 5  0.1 1  0.1 3  0.0 0 
0 to 5 17.2 20  6.5 126  8.0 206 10.3 170 2.9 10  1.3 30  3.8 100  10.6 173 
5 to 10 27.3 38  15.6 259  12.9 367 13.3 229 2.2 8  2.6 55  5.4 150  19.6 328 
10 to 15 15.6 20  23.3 390  20.0 519 9.2 160 6.4 25  6.0 138  8.6 237  17.6 294 
15 to 20 12.6 16  23.4 393  20.7 571 5.6 98 11.7 47  14.2 330  18.9 522  9.0 149 
20 to 25 9.8 11  16.8 284  17.8 472 2.1 38 20.1 78  28.7 596  27.1 726  2.0 34 
25 to 30 4.9 4  4.8 71  5.3 144 0.5 11 7.7 24  17.2 308  11.0 290  0.5 9 
30 to 35 0.5 1  1.3 18  1.9 44 0.2 2 0.0 0  1.7 33  1.8 46  0.2 4 
35 to 40 0.0 0  0.2 3  1.0 28 0.0 1 0.0 0  0.2 4  0.3 10  0.0 0 
40 to 45 0.0 0  0.3 6  0.5 12 0.1 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
45 to 50 0.0 0  0.1 2  0.2 4 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
>50 0.0 0  0.1 3  0.1 2 0.0 0 0.2 1  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 0 
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Table 5. Distribution of Household AETRs: by Family Structure                             
   AT BE  DK 






















retired No  Children 
median 
[%] 
18.1 3.1 20.6  26.8 20.6 19.1 -5.7 21.3 26.5  15.3  35.4 18.2 36.7 39.1 32.2 
mean 
[%] 































































<=-100 2.3 30 5.3 11 1.7 19 1.4 17 1.1 20 5.2 42 17.7 23 2.9 19  7.6 72  6.0 108 2.5 18  6.9 10  1.6 8  4.6 53 3.2 57 
-100 to -50 1.8 18 5.6 11 1.0 7 1.6 13 2.5 31 2.7 25 6.1 10 2.1 15  1.0 8  1.0 16 1.1 10  2.0 4  0.9 6  1.2 16 0.8 17 
-50 to -40 0.7 8 1.9 4 0.5 4 0.1 2 0.5 9 1.4 12 3.9 6 1.0 6  0.2 3  0.2 5 0.3 2  1.4 2  0.0 0  0.5 7 0.4 8 
-40 to -30 1.1 11 2.9 4 0.8 7 0.5 4 1.0 18 1.9 17 2.3 3 1.8 14  1.0 9  0.9 15 1.0 7  3.3 4  0.5 3  0.6 6 0.4 7 
-30 to -20 2.8 29 8.9 10 1.5 19 0.6 5 1.1 18 2.1 19 5.6 8 1.5 11  0.9 10  0.8 17 1.6 13  5.5 9  0.7 4  0.5 6 0.5 8 
-20 to -10 4.2 45 8.4 16 3.3 29 1.3 14 2.1 36 4.9 39 9.1 11 4.2 28  0.8 9  1.5 24 1.8 18  7.4 13  0.6 5  0.5 8 0.7 14 
-10 to 0 6.3 62 12.8 20 4.9 42 1.0 11 1.8 34 6.2 51 13.4 16 4.9 35  1.1 14  2.4 41 1.6 15  5.5 11  0.8 4  0.3 5 1.6 29 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.8 16 1.1 17 0.3 4 1.3 3 0.2 1  3.0 26  8.9 140 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 2 0.1 4 
0 to 5 5.2 54 7.8 12 4.7 42 2.4 28 10.5 195 4.2 39 4.0 6 4.3 33  5.0 40  12.6 211 1.6 14  7.8 12  0.3 2  0.6 9 2.7 53 
5 to 10 6.4 64 9.3 16 5.8 48 1.7 19 4.6 84 4.8 46 5.6 8 4.6 38  4.6 45  9.0 168 0.9 9  3.0 5  0.4 4  0.8 11 4.1 80 
10 to 15 10.3 107 10.1 17 10.3 90 3.8 47 9.7 195 7.4 72 2.6 6 8.3 66  4.0 42  6.4 123 1.2 13  2.9 7  0.8 6  0.6 14 4.7 102 
15 to 20 13.2 121 10.5 12 13.7 109 8.6 92 12.2 221 10.4 94 5.9 9 11.2 85  8.1 81  8.3 150 3.4 31  7.8 13  2.4 18  1.8 25 7.6 161 
20 to 25 18.8 175 8.7 18 20.9 157 15.2 171 13.3 242 11.7 122 4.4 8 13.0 114  9.9 105  7.8 153 4.6 46  7.4 12  4.0 34  3.9 57 9.5 219 
25 to 30 14.3 129 6.3 11 15.9 118 25.5 246 17.2 283 13.4 127 6.7 10 14.7 117  12.5 138  9.1 186 7.9 82  8.8 17  7.7 65  5.2 72 9.6 244 
30 to 35 8.3 72 1.5 3 9.7 69 19.9 178 12.5 190 12.1 119 3.8 6 13.6 113  14.7 162  9.0 186 18.8 190  21.4 38  18.3 152  11.8 186 9.5 231 
35 to 40 3.3 26 0.0 0 4.0 26 10.2 89 6.1 92 6.9 73 5.3 8 7.2 65  13.3 157  7.6 171 28.6 284  6.1 10  33.4 274  22.0 337 14.8 348 
40 to 45 0.9 7 0.0 0 1.1 7 2.9 22 1.7 23 2.7 31 1.3 2 3.0 29  6.9 80  4.1 90 15.9 155  2.3 4  18.8 151  31.4 460 20.6 464 
45 to 50 0.2 1 0.0 0 0.2 1 1.5 7 0.9 7 0.8 8 0.6 1 0.8 7  1.6 19  1.1 23 5.7 51  0.3 1  6.9 50  8.9 128 5.8 129 
>50 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.7 7 0.5 1 0.8 6  3.8 38  3.4 60 1.6 14  0.2 1  1.9 13  4.7 66 3.2 68 
   100.0 959 100.0 165 100.0 794 100.0 981 100.0 1715 100.0 947 100.0 145 100.0 802  100.0 1058  100.0 1887 100.0 972  100.0 173  100.0 799  100.0 1468 100.0 2243 
 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. Modal values are shown in bold typeface. ‘Children’ are persons aged under 18.   34
 
Table 5. (continued)                                        
   FI FR GE 





















retired  No Children 
median [%] 
18.5 7.2 20.3 27.4 22.1 15.7 -9.8 17.0 22.3 17.6 21.5 -2.2 24.1 30.0  9.7 
mean   [%] 































































<=-100  5.2 91  15.0 36  2.8 55  5.5 176 10.1 383  4.9 161 20.8 76 2.8 85  3.9 197  3.0 228 11.9 228  32.1 137  5.1 91  6.7 154 4.6 178 
-100 to -50  2.9 64  4.6 15  2.5 49  2.6 92 5.3 215  4.8 160 14.5 55 3.5 105  2.9 151  2.3 185 3.0 83  4.2 27  2.6 56  1.2 43 1.6 73 
-50 to -40  1.2 28  1.4 6  1.2 22  0.8 25 1.5 66  0.9 32 2.2 8 0.8 24  1.2 62  1.1 83 0.7 19  1.7 8  0.3 11  0.5 16 0.7 22 
-40 to -30  2.1 48  4.6 12  1.5 36  1.4 46 2.1 90  1.6 54 2.8 11 1.4 43  1.3 69  1.3 102 1.1 21  1.7 7  0.8 14  0.9 20 1.0 40 
-30 to -20  2.0 50  2.3 8  2.0 42  1.4 56 2.2 104  2.2 79 4.4 17 2.0 62  2.2 110  2.1 158 1.6 45  2.1 13  1.4 32  0.6 21 0.6 34 
-20 to -10  3.3 91  3.6 13  3.3 78  2.2 84 3.5 164  4.4 149 5.1 20 4.2 129  3.3 165  3.7 278 3.1 84  5.0 26  2.4 58  1.2 47 1.4 80 
-10 to 0  5.2 154  6.7 25  4.8 129  3.6 140 4.5 237  7.4 251 9.5 35 7.2 216  5.0 254  5.7 434 3.2 97  3.9 24  3.0 73  1.7 66 3.0 146 
0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 1 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  2.4 63 1.9 82 
0 to 5  5.1 133  7.5 19  4.5 114  2.3 101 2.8 161  5.6 191 5.0 18 5.6 173  3.4 185  5.5 431 2.3 74  1.9 10  2.4 64  2.0 67 4.8 215 
5 to 10  6.8 190  8.3 34  6.5 156  2.5 118 3.0 188  7.8 269 8.9 33 7.6 236  4.1 227  7.0 554 5.6 125  6.4 23  5.4 102  3.5 128 30.7 1300 
10 to 15  8.2 249  7.9 27  8.3 222  3.8 168 4.4 269  9.1 312 6.4 24 9.5 288  6.3 329  11.2 857 5.5 169  3.9 23  6.0 146  4.0 151 3.6 200 
15 to 20  11.4 361  8.5 34  12.1 327  6.2 300 6.6 433  14.7 505 9.1 34 15.4 471  9.7 530  13.8 1089 9.2 254  5.3 28  10.5 226  7.6 249 5.3 275 
20 to 25  15.4 474  12.1 38  16.2 436  10.6 544 10.4 764  18.5 628 6.5 24 20.0 604  17.8 992  16.1 1307 12.1 324  5.6 28  14.2 296  8.6 308 5.4 320 
25 to 30  14.3 485  10.2 43  15.3 442  18.9 991 16.0 1232  13.7 464 3.1 11 15.1 453  26.5 1432  18.7 1521 12.1 363  8.4 35  13.3 328  9.1 379 5.6 381 
30 to 35  9.6 354  4.7 20  10.7 334  21.6 1147 15.8 1298  3.6 122 0.5 2 4.0 120  9.9 507  6.7 521 16.4 416  9.7 38  18.6 378  11.6 498 6.9 499 
35 to 40  4.7 206  1.9 12  5.4 194  11.2 725 7.8 777  0.8 25 0.9 3 0.7 22  1.9 102  1.3 104 9.3 250  4.8 24  10.9 226  18.2 661 10.8 661 
40 to 45  1.6 76  0.2 2  1.9 74  4.0 321 2.9 342  0.2 6 0.3 1 0.2 5  0.4 19  0.3 20 2.0 50  2.5 9  1.8 41  15.3 449 9.2 450 
45 to 50  0.8 37  0.3 2  0.9 35  0.9 102 0.6 107  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.1 5  0.1 5 0.7 5  0.7 2  0.7 3  4.5 105 2.7 105 
>50  0.4 21  0.2 2  0.4 19  0.6 65 0.4 67  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.1 4  0.1 5 0.3 3  0.0 0  0.4 3  0.3 6 0.2 6 
   100.0 3112  100.0 348  100.0 2764  100.0 5201 100.0 6898  100.0 3408 100.0 372 100.0 3036  100.0 5341  100.0 7883 100.0 2610  100.0 462  100.0 2148  100.0 3431 100.0 5067   35
 
Table 5. (continued)                                        
   GR IR  IT 





















retired  No Children 
median [%] 
20.5 9.3  21.0 16.2  7.2  8.1 -13.6 11.2 10.7  3.4  23.8 16.0 24.2 24.5 18.1 
mean   [%] 































































<=-100  1.7 23  10.0 9  1.1 14  1.2 27 7.8 271  9.0 107 32.5 58 3.6 49  4.4 46  3.5 51 0.5 12  1.5 2  0.4 10  0.2 10 1.1 59 
-100 to -50  0.4 7  0.0 0  0.4 7  0.7 19 1.7 70  1.7 32 3.4 13 1.3 19  2.0 27  1.6 33 1.2 34  0.2 1  1.3 33  0.2 8 1.3 56 
-50 to -40  0.1 3  0.5 1  0.1 2  0.2 8 0.5 19  1.2 26 2.0 6 1.0 20  0.5 9  0.8 19 1.2 20  1.4 1  1.1 19  0.1 2 0.4 27 
-40 to -30  0.4 7  3.6 4  0.1 3  0.7 16 1.2 44  1.7 31 1.9 10 1.7 21  0.8 10  0.7 12 1.4 34  0.8 3  1.4 31  0.2 6 0.4 23 
-30 to -20  0.6 8  2.7 2  0.4 6  0.6 18 1.2 47  4.3 71 4.2 14 4.4 57  1.1 16  0.9 19 1.1 35  1.9 5  1.1 30  0.2 8 0.6 33 
-20 to -10  1.5 21  9.0 6  1.0 15  1.9 51 3.0 119  9.3 154 12.4 34 8.6 120  0.9 24  0.8 25 2.5 63  6.3 5  2.2 58  0.8 22 1.5 77 
-10 to 0  5.2 82  12.1 11  4.7 71  7.7 184 9.0 317  12.8 227 18.3 47 11.6 180  1.0 30  0.9 32 4.3 114  8.5 16  3.9 98  1.5 53 4.2 245 
0  0.1 1  0.0 0  0.1 1  5.0 143 3.4 146  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  24.4 284  35.4 601 0.5 15  1.1 3  0.5 12  0.4 11 1.2 55 
0 to 5  4.6 70  9.8 9  4.2 61  9.6 240 15.4 502  5.4 129 5.4 22 5.4 107  7.3 154  7.1 186 3.5 100  10.6 17  2.9 83  2.0 68 8.9 422 
5 to 10  4.3 74  2.9 3  4.4 71  8.9 255 11.4 423  9.0 208 8.6 35 9.1 173  6.1 150  5.7 174 4.1 106  7.2 19  3.8 87  3.1 95 8.2 450 
10 to 15  9.4 137  8.0 7  9.5 130  9.9 291 8.0 338  14.9 329 6.2 29 17.0 300  10.2 212  9.7 242 7.8 204  7.7 23  7.9 181  5.6 161 10.6 599 
15 to 20  20.0 269  17.6 13  20.2 256  16.8 474 12.0 496  13.4 289 4.0 19 15.6 270  13.6 269  11.2 289 9.4 276  16.4 35  8.8 241  14.7 441 18.8 1017 
20 to 25  15.6 210  13.6 11  15.8 199  14.0 399 9.6 406  7.9 162 0.9 5 9.6 157  10.0 172  7.9 179 17.5 463  14.0 26  17.8 437  24.5 726 17.2 961 
25 to 30  13.4 191  7.9 7  13.8 184  9.3 237 6.4 242  5.2 105 0.3 2 6.3 103  8.6 118  6.7 125 22.1 593  14.7 38  22.8 555  24.2 715 13.7 782 
30 to 35  12.4 166  1.4 2  13.2 164  7.6 209 5.3 216  2.8 56 0.0 0 3.5 56  7.1 86  5.5 90 14.4 370  4.1 13  15.3 357  12.8 377 7.0 394 
35 to 40  7.9 106  0.9 1  8.4 105  3.8 94 2.6 95  1.1 22 0.0 0 1.3 22  2.0 18  1.6 20 5.5 151  2.0 4  5.8 147  6.7 179 3.6 184 
40 to 45  1.8 22  0.0 0  1.9 22  1.6 42 1.1 42  0.1 1 0.0 0 0.1 1  0.1 2  0.1 2 1.8 47  0.2 1  1.9 46  2.2 65 1.2 65 
45 to 50  0.4 5  0.0 0  0.4 5  0.2 8 0.2 8  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 11  0.0 0  0.3 11  0.2 7 0.1 8 
>50  0.3 4  0.0 0  0.3 4  0.2 7 0.1 7  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.8 20  1.5 2  0.7 18  0.4 10 0.2 10 
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Table 5. (continued)                                        
   LU NL PT 





















retired  No Children 
median [%] 
5.3 -5.1  6.0 19.1 15.1 23.3  -145.5  24.0 28.1 24.4 15.0 4.9 15.5 16.0  9.9 
mean   [%] 































































<=-100  2.1 15  6.0 5  1.6 10  1.3 14 0.9 15  6.4 95 49.9 71 1.4 24  9.8 185  7.1 199 3.5 86  6.8 19  2.9 67  1.8 33 1.2 37 
-100 to -50  3.4 32  9.2 10  2.7 22  0.5 6 0.6 10  0.4 6 2.4 4 0.1 2  2.4 51  1.6 51 0.6 19  1.6 5  0.4 14  1.1 17 0.9 31 
-50 to -40  2.3 21  5.6 5  1.9 16  0.0 0 0.1 2  0.3 4 2.2 3 0.1 1  0.6 15  0.4 15 0.5 14  0.2 3  0.5 11  0.6 8 0.5 12 
-40 to -30  2.7 22  4.5 4  2.5 18  0.3 3 0.4 6  0.1 2 1.2 2 0.0 0  0.2 7  0.2 7 0.5 11  1.8 4  0.3 7  0.4 10 0.3 11 
-30 to -20  4.4 40  4.2 5  4.4 35  0.6 7 0.7 10  0.2 4 1.2 2 0.1 2  0.4 11  0.2 11 0.8 19  0.9 3  0.8 16  0.4 8 0.5 17 
-20 to -10  7.6 64  10.5 10  7.2 54  1.0 9 1.7 19  1.0 16 4.2 6 0.7 10  1.0 19  0.8 22 1.3 40  3.0 11  1.0 29  0.9 20 1.1 38 
-10 to 0  14.2 124  16.8 16  13.9 108  2.1 19 2.5 35  1.9 31 7.9 10 1.3 21  1.5 27  2.2 61 5.9 91  19.7 26  3.6 65  1.7 35 2.2 64 
0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.4 10  0.3 11 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  3.2 61 24.4 828 
0 to 5  12.7 101  11.8 13  12.8 88  3.1 29 9.1 121  0.9 16 0.6 1 1.0 15  1.2 22  2.2 62 5.7 131  15.9 39  4.1 92  5.6 94 10.6 286 
5 to 10  15.9 135  9.4 11  16.8 124  8.5 98 16.3 248  2.4 35 6.8 8 1.9 27  1.8 39  5.5 169 12.6 236  15.3 39  12.1 197  9.5 199 8.3 250 
10 to 15  11.4 93  7.6 10  11.9 83  16.7 229 17.7 330  4.7 72 6.1 10 4.5 62  3.0 67  13.4 443 18.6 369  9.0 40  20.1 329  19.4 381 13.9 416 
15 to 20  8.2 61  3.7 3  8.8 58  18.5 251 15.3 301  13.6 213 7.0 9 14.3 204  4.0 68  9.3 267 22.2 365  14.1 28  23.5 337  24.6 489 16.1 516 
20 to 25  6.7 50  8.1 7  6.5 43  16.8 208 12.8 241  27.2 408 7.3 9 29.5 399  8.8 185  8.4 267 13.8 219  6.2 11  15.1 208  13.9 267 9.1 275 
25 to 30  5.2 36  0.0 0  5.9 36  12.7 147 9.4 166  24.7 356 1.4 2 27.4 354  27.2 564  20.9 639 7.0 92  2.8 6  7.6 86  8.2 129 5.3 135 
30 to 35  2.6 19  2.5 2  2.6 17  9.3 109 6.6 120  11.2 171 0.5 1 12.4 170  27.9 574  20.0 616 6.2 74  2.0 4  6.8 70  6.4 78 4.1 80 
35 to 40  0.5 4  0.0 0  0.6 4  5.7 59 3.7 61  2.3 36 0.6 1 2.4 35  6.3 132  5.0 150 1.0 14  0.7 3  1.0 11  1.7 21 1.1 22 
40 to 45  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  2.3 26 1.8 30  1.6 23 0.0 0 1.8 23  2.1 40  1.5 45 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.3 3 0.2 3 
45 to 50  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.6 6 0.4 7  0.5 7 0.7 1 0.4 6  0.8 17  0.6 20 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 
>50  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0  0.5 7 0.0 0 0.6 7  0.4 9  0.3 11 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.3 5 0.2 5 
   100.0 817  100.0 101  100.0 716  100.0 1220 100.0 1722  100.0 1502 100.0 140 100.0 1362  100.0 2042  100.0 3066 100.0 1780  100.0 241  100.0 1539  100.0 1858 100.0 3026 
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Table 5. (continued)                          
   SP UK 














retired  No Children
median [%] 
14.2 3.8  14.6 12.8  9.6  14.1  -791.7  17.8 19.6  13.8 
mean   [%] 











































<=-100  0.8 21  4.2 8  0.6 13  0.3 10 0.3 11  27.0 528 67.4 314 13.8 214  11.9 349  10.6 463 
-100 to -50  0.4 6  0.5 1  0.4 5  0.4 7 0.3 8  3.0 56 5.7 26 2.0 30  3.0 96  5.0 246 
-50 to -40  0.2 2  1.2 1  0.1 1  0.0 0 0.0 1  0.8 16 1.6 7 0.6 9  0.9 27  1.6 79 
-40 to -30  0.3 5  0.2 1  0.3 4  0.0 1 0.0 2  1.0 20 1.3 6 0.9 14  1.2 40  2.1 105 
-30 to -20  0.7 14  2.1 3  0.7 11  0.1 5 0.1 6  0.9 18 1.3 6 0.8 12  1.3 40  2.0 98 
-20 to -10  1.4 24  1.4 2  1.4 22  0.3 7 0.3 10  1.6 32 2.3 10 1.4 22  1.4 47  2.4 117 
-10 to 0  7.0 133  28.0 40  5.7 93  1.5 51 1.2 61  3.8 75 5.2 23 3.3 52  2.6 80  3.6 175 
0  0.2 4  0.0 0  0.2 4  17.6 497 26.8 1066  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.3 9  0.2 9 
0 to 5  7.2 145  13.9 20  6.8 125  7.4 230 8.9 377  2.3 45 1.5 6 2.5 39  3.0 99  5.3 268 
5 to 10  15.4 284  16.7 20  15.4 264  12.2 412 13.3 609  2.9 57 1.9 9 3.2 48  4.6 162  9.2 484 
10 to 15  19.6 351  10.8 15  20.2 336  19.0 580 17.1 738  8.1 160 5.0 22 9.2 138  7.1 246  10.3 534 
15 to 20  22.2 384  17.2 17  22.5 367  18.3 605 14.9 694  20.4 414 5.0 22 25.4 392  14.1 480  12.8 634 
20 to 25  17.2 300  2.8 5  18.1 295  15.1 481 11.2 505  21.2 431 1.3 6 27.8 425  29.5 964  21.4 ### 
25 to 30  4.1 65  0.3 1  4.4 64  5.2 163 3.7 165  5.8 121 0.4 2 7.6 119  16.7 506  11.8 510 
30 to 35  1.8 26  0.0 0  2.0 26  1.3 38 1.0 39  0.9 18 0.0 0 1.2 18  2.0 64  1.4 65 
35 to 40  0.9 14  0.5 1  0.9 13  0.5 18 0.4 18  0.3 6 0.0 0 0.4 6  0.2 8  0.2 8 
40 to 45  0.4 6  0.0 0  0.4 6  0.4 14 0.3 14  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
45 to 50  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.1 3  0.2 3 0.1 3  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 
>50  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 5 0.1 5  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.1 2  0.0 2 
   100.0 1787  100.0 135  100.0 1652  100.0 3127 100.0 4332  100.0 1997 100.0 459 100.0 1538  100.0 3219  100.0 4800 
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Table 6a. Distribution of Individual AETRs on Labour Income (non-civil servant employees)                  
   AT BE DK  FI  FR GE GR IR  IT  LU NL PT SP UK 
median 
[%]  42.1 52.1 44.0 44.3 44.8 47.3 36.2 22.4 43.1 26.6 37.1 32.3 34.4 27.1 
mean   
[%]  44.5 55.4 46.8 48.3 46.8 48.7 36.4 27.0 45.2 32.4 40.2 37.4 36.1 28.5 



























































<0  0.3 8 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 2.1 119
0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 7.0 494  16.6 330 7.1 226 0.3 9  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 6.3 333
0 to 5  0.1 3 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.9 30 0.0 3 0.9 84  5.6 97 5.1 160 0.1 2  0.0 0 0.3 5 0.0 0  0.5 19 0.8 41
5 to 10  0.1 4 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.8 50 0.2 11 0.9 61  0.7 12 5.7 162 0.1 2  0.3 6 1.0 32 0.0 0  2.2 90 5.0 264
10 to 15  0.1 4 0.0 0 3.4 51  1.2 67 0.3 22 0.1 12  0.1 2 9.7 252 0.0 2  0.0 0 1.9 59 0.0 0  3.2 105 4.3 226
15 to 20  5.0 110 0.0 0 0.2 5  1.5 92 0.4 24 0.2 14  0.1 2 14.6 376 1.3 59  0.9 17 3.9 130 0.0 0  3.4 108 6.8 334
20 to 25  0.2 4 0.0 0 0.7 11  4.4 330 0.6 34 0.1 9  0.1 3 19.6 493 0.0 0  38.4 806 3.9 131 0.0 0  2.6 93 14.3 713
25 to 30  1.3 21 0.0 0 1.5 23  3.6 215 0.8 49 0.3 16  0.1 2 17.8 432 3.9 187  26.9 603 8.1 251 24.9 920  19.2 702 38.8 1969
30 to 35  14.4 295 0.0 0 3.1 56  6.9 346 2.8 185 7.1 416  0.1 4 10.4 228 9.4 394  16.6 341 19.0 617 50.2 1642  22.4 790 19.4 957
35 to 40  16.5 353 9.2 118 15.4 263  7.9 425 10.8 723 7.9 641  67.9 1278 8.0 167 11.7 483  10.4 199 33.5 1057 14.5 383  34.8 1220 2.0 104
40 to 45  33.4 666 10.4 124 34.9 584  28.0 1375 35.8 2301 14.7 1117  7.1 125 2.0 39 45.5 1712  5.2 101 26.2 829 5.3 119  9.2 317 0.3 18
45 to 50  25.9 465 20.3 258 23.9 388  30.3 1582 40.7 2533 30.6 2289  1.4 24 0.0 0 23.9 920  1.3 24 1.7 57 5.0 74  1.3 45 0.0 0
50 to 55  2.7 50 27.7 368 13.5 205  12.0 787 6.7 415 27.0 1587  0.1 3 0.0 0 3.3 117  0.0 1 0.3 12 0.1 3  0.6 19 0.0 0
55 to 60  0.0 0 25.7 361 1.6 27  2.3 195 0.7 46 3.0 135  0.0 1 0.0 0 0.4 11  0.0 0 0.1 4 0.0 0  0.2 7 0.0 0
60 to 65  0.0 0 6.1 90 0.7 11  0.3 25 0.0 3 0.1 4  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.1 7 0.0 0
65 to 70  0.0 0 0.5 7 0.3 4  0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0
>70  0.0 0 0.1 1 0.8 13  0.0 1 0.1 4 0.0 1  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 6 0.0 0  0.1 6 0.0 0
   100.0 1983 100.0 1327 100.0 1641  100.0 5522 100.0 6353 100.0 6880  100.0 1883 100.0 2535 100.0 3899  100.0 2098 100.0 3190 100.0 3141  100.0 3528 100.0 5078
 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. To avoid difficult to interpret ‘distortions’ due to highly negative 
AETRs (as a result of refundable tax credits), standard deviations have only been computed for those observations with AETR values between +/- 100%. See text for further 
explanations.   39
 
















AETR [%]   
mean 
AETR [%]   
mean 
AETR [%]   
mean 
AETR [%] 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1  BE 45.1  BE 55.4  BE 54.1  BE 55.9  DK DK  DK  BE  BE  BE  BE  BE  BE  BE 
2  FI 43.8  GE 48.7 GE 48.5 GE 48.8 FR FR  BE  GE  GE  GE  GE  GE  GE  FI 
3  GE 43.7  FI 48.3  FR 45.3  FI 48.4  BE BE  FR  FR  FI  FI  FI  FI  FI  DK 
4  DK 42.7  FR 46.8 DK 44.8 DK 47.6  IT GE  GE  DK  FR IT  AT AT AT IT 
5  FR 41.3  DK 46.8  FI 44.8  IT 46.5  NL IT  IT  FI  IT  DK  IT  IT  IT  GE 
6  AT 41.0  IT 45.2  IT 43.3  AT 46.3  PT AT  FI IT DK  AT DK  DK  DK  AT 
7  NL 35.9  AT 44.5  AT 41.9  FR 44.2  AT FI  AT  AT  AT  FR  FR  FR  FR  FR 
8  IT 35.3  NL 40.2  NL 36.4  NL 38.9  SP PT NL NL NL NL NL NL GR PT 
9  LU 31.7  PT 37.4  PT 35.9  PT 38.0  LU SP  PT  PT  GR GR SP  SP  SP  GR 
10  SP 29.6  GR 36.4  SP 35.6  GR 37.2  FI LU LU SP SP SP GR GR NL NL 
11  GR 28.7  SP 36.1  GR 34.6  SP 36.2  IR NL  SP  GR PT  PT  PT  PT  PT  LU 
12  UK 25.4  LU 32.4 LU 31.5 LU 32.7  GR GR  UK  LU UK  UK  LU LU LU SP 
13  PT 24.8  UK 28.5  IR 25.4  UK 30.3  GE UK  GR UK  LU  LU  UK  UK  IR  IR 
14  IR 23.2  IR 27.0  UK 25.0  IR 27.7  UK IR IR IR IR IR IR IR UK  UK 
 
 
Table 7. Mean Individual AETRs (Labour Income) by Decile Group of Gross Earnings 
%  AT BE DK FI FR GE GR IR  IT LU NL PT SP UK 
Decile 
Group                  
1  28.3 42.3 50.5  20.3 42.6 6.4  6.4 6.5 32.3 22.7  30.2 29.2 27.0  -2.5
2  34.6 45.4 46.9  31.9 45.5 36.1  16.6 7.0 35.5 24.1  23.0 29.1 26.1  9.0
3  37.3 49.0 52.0  39.6 47.3 41.7  17.7 14.7 40.1 26.1  30.4 30.2 25.6  19.6
4  40.5 50.0 42.7  42.6 43.9 44.9  29.9 17.6 42.1 26.1  35.0 31.2 30.7  24.1
5  42.4 52.4 42.8  43.7 42.9 46.6  35.1 21.2 42.8 27.0  38.1 31.9 32.2  27.1
6  43.6 53.3 43.6  45.1 42.6 48.3  34.7 24.2 43.8 27.9  38.8 32.4 34.6  28.2
7  45.2 54.5 43.5  46.3 43.0 49.3  35.5 25.4 44.8 29.8  39.8 33.4 35.6  29.1
8  47.0 55.8 44.3  47.5 43.4 50.6  36.9 28.9 45.9 31.5  38.2 35.1 37.1  30.2
9  49.0 58.2 46.5  49.9 44.1 52.0  39.9 32.1 47.5 34.4  38.0 37.8 38.5  30.4
10  49.0 61.3 52.5  54.6 46.8 51.5  42.4 35.2 51.7 39.3  41.6 45.2 39.3  34.2
 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. ‘Gross Earnings’ include employer SIC.   40
 
Table 8. Distribution of Marginal Effective Tax Rates                                
   AT BE DK  FI  FR 
   women men  women men  women men  women men  women men 
median [%]  41.5 45.4  49.9 49.9  51.2 51.2  45.3 49.3  34.9 34.9 








































































<0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.2 17 2.3 28 1.8 45 0.8 16 1.2 23  1.0 39  0.7 85 0.6 70 0.7 155  0.6 34 0.6 38 0.6 72 
0 15.9 253 8.9 157  11.8 410  8.5 89 7.9 106 8.2 195 1.5 18 1.1 15  1.2 33  7.9 951 12.5 1447 10.2 2398  4.1 240 2.4 179 3.2 419 
0 to 5 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 1  0.0 1  1.2 195 2.1 372 1.7 567  0.5 31 0.5 36 0.5 67 
5 to 10 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 2 0.1 2 0.5 9 0.4 8  0.4 17  0.8 72 0.8 89 0.8 161  0.6 33 1.0 66 0.8 99 
10 to 15 0.1 1 0.1 1  0.1 2  3.9 49 2.2 35 3.0 84 0.1 2 0.1 1  0.1 3  0.5 58 0.3 45 0.4 103  0.7 43 1.3 95 1.1 138 
15 to 20 14.0 169 1.0 19  6.3 188  0.1 1 0.3 5 0.2 6 0.1 1 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.5 41 0.3 39 0.4 80  1.6 89 2.2 153 1.9 242 
20 to 25 1.6 17 0.3 7  0.8 24  0.5 7 1.1 14 0.8 21 0.1 1 0.1 1  0.1 2  2.5 181 1.6 101 2.1 282  7.9 447 8.7 608 8.3 1055 
25 to 30 0.9 13 0.4 8  0.6 21  1.4 17 1.3 15 1.3 32 0.1 1 0.1 1  0.1 2  4.6 280 3.2 157 3.9 437  13.1 753 15.1 1059 14.2 1812 
30 to 35 3.4 41 1.0 19  2.0 60  2.0 25 1.8 31 1.9 56 0.0 0 0.1 1  0.0 1  3.7 240 2.5 159 3.1 399  35.4 1987 30.9 2141 32.9 4128 
35 to 40 8.3 93 6.3 125  7.1 218  5.3 65 4.1 59 4.6 124 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  5.4 347 3.4 239 4.3 586  16.0 880 17.9 1226 17.0 2106 
40 to 45 20.2 233 28.6 523  25.2 756  9.0 113 6.3 93 7.5 206 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  18.4 1166 11.8 719 15.0 1885  7.6 411 6.8 449 7.2 860 
45 to 50 19.7 224 28.2 541  24.7 765  28.1 387 27.2 436 27.6 823 11.1 203 10.4 200  10.7 403  22.0 1394 18.4 1178 20.1 2572  5.7 300 5.4 355 5.6 655 
50 to 55 7.0 84 13.5 230  10.9 314  33.3 459 36.3 604 35.0 1063 58.8 1011 44.5 859  51.2 1870  17.1 1169 20.4 1403 18.7 2572  1.2 65 1.6 105 1.4 170 
55 to 60 4.4 41 7.3 123  6.1 164  2.6 31 5.2 87 4.0 118 2.2 38 1.7 30  1.9 68  7.5 576 14.6 1266 11.2 1842  0.6 34 0.9 63 0.8 97 
60 to 65 0.7 12 0.7 11  0.7 23  0.4 7 0.9 17 0.7 24 20.3 354 36.9 692  29.1 1046  1.3 97 2.9 276 2.1 373  0.4 22 0.7 51 0.6 73 
65 to 70 0.3 2 0.1 2  0.2 4  0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 16 0.5 10  0.8 26  0.4 16 0.5 18 0.4 34  0.2 9 0.3 25 0.3 34 
70 to 75 0.0 0 0.0 1  0.0 1  0.2 2 0.0 1 0.1 3 0.6 8 0.2 5  0.4 13  0.4 19 0.3 20 0.4 39  0.3 15 0.4 24 0.3 39 
75 to 80 0.0 0 0.1 3  0.1 3  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.4 6 0.3 5  0.4 11  0.4 15 0.3 15 0.3 30  0.2 11 0.4 26 0.3 37 
80 to 85 0.0 1 0.1 2  0.1 3  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.2 21 1.6 25  1.4 46  0.5 20 0.1 8 0.3 28  0.2 7 0.2 16 0.2 23 
85 to 90 0.0 0 0.1 3  0.1 3  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 1 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.2 9 0.2 10 0.2 19  0.2 13 0.2 18 0.2 31 
90 to 95 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 8 0.0 2 0.1 10  0.8 45 0.6 42 0.7 87 
95 to 100 1.8 26 2.6 51  2.3 77  3.1 37 2.5 33 2.8 70 0.9 16 0.6 10  0.8 26  3.8 156 3.0 128 3.4 284  1.6 89 1.3 88 1.4 177 
>100 1.7 18 0.5 9  1.0 27  0.3 4 0.4 6 0.3 10 0.3 5 0.1 2  0.2 7  0.1 4 0.2 7 0.1 11  0.5 30 0.6 35 0.6 65 
   100.0 1228 100.0 1835  100.0 3063  100.0 1312 100.0 1572 100.0 2884 100.0 1727 100.0 1889  100.0 3616  100.0 7099 100.0 7768 100.0 14867  100.0 5588 100.0 6898 100.0 12486 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. To avoid difficult to interpret ‘distortions’ due to very high or highly 
negative METRs, standard deviations have only been computed for those observations with METR values between +/- 100%. See text for further explanations. Modal values are 
shown in bold typeface.   41
 
Table 8. (continued)                                          
   GE GR IR  IT  LU 
   women  men women  men women  men women  men women  men 
median [%]  53.2  51.4 23.2  30.0 30.8  30.8 33.3  39.6 34.4  35.9 








































































<0 0.2 7  0.2 9  0.2 16 1.5 25 1.2 43 1.3 68 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0 3 0.0 0  0.1 2  0.1 2
0 5.2 237  3.8 187  4.4 424 33.6 625 22.1 843 25.7 1468 22.0 486  8.6 318  13.4 804 18.7 585 12.7 657 15.0 1242 9.1 111  5.4 121  6.8 232
0 to 5 1.0 36  0.2 8  0.5 44 3.8 59 2.2 85 2.7 144 1.3 20  6.8 231  4.8 251 0.5 9 0.7 31 0.6 40 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0
5 to 10 0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 3 0.6 9 1.1 41 0.9 50 0.1 2  1.2 60  0.8 62 3.3 109 2.7 150 2.9 259 0.4 5  0.8 11  0.7 16
10 to 15 1.2 48  0.3 18  0.7 66 2.4 37 7.0 242 5.5 279 0.5 13  3.1 161  2.1 174 0.2 6 0.4 22 0.3 28 17.1 207  16.9 313  17.0 520
15 to 20 0.6 42  0.1 6  0.3 48 6.6 115 5.2 194 5.7 309 1.9 30  5.1 194  3.9 224 1.6 53 0.4 20 0.9 73 5.5 56  4.5 82  4.9 138
20 to 25 3.0 126  1.2 77  2.0 203 9.2 141 4.4 150 6.0 291 6.6 116  6.2 219  6.4 335 2.2 74 1.9 102 2.0 176 4.6 47  2.6 43  3.3 90
25 to 30 1.3 69  1.9 85  1.6 154 7.5 112 15.5 534 13.0 646 10.5 160  12.0 344  11.5 504 7.0 244 1.9 103 3.9 347 6.3 78  5.5 111  5.8 189
30 to 35 5.5 183  6.5 345  6.0 528 7.9 126 7.7 251 7.8 377 9.3 153  15.9 441  13.5 594 22.6 685 16.4 850 18.7 1535 8.6 102  12.6 233  11.1 335
35 to 40 4.2 166  6.8 285  5.7 451 16.2 257 19.9 622 18.7 879 1.7 32  0.9 29  1.2 61 20.6 694 24.2 1324 22.8 2018 7.6 94  12.6 230  10.7 324
40 to 45 5.2 215  7.6 350  6.6 565 2.9 40 5.0 153 4.3 193 1.9 36  2.6 84  2.4 120 5.5 167 7.5 411 6.8 578 8.6 93  11.7 194  10.5 287
45 to 50 8.9 385  14.5 729  12.0 1114 4.4 64 5.6 171 5.2 235 19.2 294  23.7 657  22.0 951 12.0 356 19.0 949 16.4 1305 14.3 136  16.5 258  15.6 394
50 to 55 31.4 1328  32.3 1753  31.9 3081 0.6 12 1.0 35 0.9 47 17.8 261  9.7 212  12.6 473 2.5 69 6.6 339 5.1 408 13.9 138  8.3 144  10.4 282
55 to 60 20.6 749  16.3 773  18.2 1522 1.5 23 0.5 18 0.9 41 2.3 35  0.8 19  1.3 54 0.7 13 0.5 30 0.6 43 1.4 13  0.8 15  1.1 28
60 to 65 2.2 86  2.3 100  2.2 186 0.1 1 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.4 8  1.3 44  1.0 52 0.6 18 0.5 29 0.5 47 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0
65 to 70 2.4 82  1.6 85  1.9 167 0.1 1 0.0 1 0.1 2 0.3 6  0.1 2  0.1 8 0.3 11 0.3 19 0.3 30 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0
70 to 75 0.3 19  0.6 35  0.5 54 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.4 5  0.0 1  0.2 6 0.2 3 0.7 21 0.5 24 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0
75 to 80 0.8 17  0.7 26  0.7 43 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.3 5  0.5 12  0.4 17 0.0 2 0.3 21 0.2 23 0.1 2  0.0 1  0.1 3
80 to 85 0.1 6  0.5 37  0.3 43 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.6 10  0.2 4  0.3 14 0.2 9 0.7 30 0.5 39 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 1
85 to 90 0.1 6  0.0 5  0.1 11 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 3 0.1 5 0.1 7 0.1 12 1.0 10  0.3 4  0.6 14
90 to 95 0.0 2  0.0 0  0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1  0.0 0  0.0 1 0.0 2 0.2 12 0.1 14 0.9 8  0.8 12  0.9 20
95 to 100 3.2 125  2.1 132  2.6 257 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.7 12  0.5 12  0.6 24 0.1 6 0.5 24 0.4 30 0.1 1  0.1 1  0.1 2
>100 2.7 102  0.7 33  1.6 135 1.1 17 1.3 41 1.3 58 2.0 31  0.8 24  1.3 55 0.8 24 1.8 90 1.4 114 0.6 5  0.4 8  0.5 13
   100.0 4039  100.0 5078  100.0 9117 100.0 1664 100.0 3426 100.0 5090 100.0 1719  100.0 3068  100.0 4787 100.0 3145 100.0 5243 100.0 8388 100.0 1106  100.0 1784  100.0 2890  42
 
Table 8. (continued)                                 
   NL PT SP UK 
   women  men women  men women  men women  men 
median [%]  42.6  42.6 26.0  26.0 23.4  24.8 31.4  31.7 


























































<0 3.3 72  3.8 93  3.6 165 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.3 6  0.3 11  0.3 17 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
0 5.1 109  1.8 47  3.2 156 15.3 341 10.5 339 12.5 680 31.8 696  19.1 782  23.5 1478 8.0 254 1.6 52 4.5 306
0 to 5 0.0 2  0.0 1  0.0 3 0.0 0 0.1 3 0.0 3 2.0 45  1.1 50  1.4 95 0.1 2 0.0 0 0.0 2
5 to 10 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 1 0.2 3 0.4 17 0.3 20 7.1 156  5.4 224  6.0 380 3.4 104 0.3 9 1.7 113
10 to 15 0.0 1  0.0 1  0.0 2 13.4 306 14.1 494 13.8 800 0.1 3  0.4 23  0.3 26 0.2 6 0.0 1 0.1 7
15 to 20 0.0 1  0.1 2  0.1 3 6.2 184 2.4 71 4.0 255 3.1 69  4.7 188  4.2 257 3.1 96 1.4 45 2.2 141
20 to 25 0.0 1  0.0 1  0.0 2 4.3 87 7.5 261 6.2 348 10.1 220  19.7 847  16.4 1067 6.0 179 9.9 350 8.1 529
25 to 30 0.1 4  0.0 0  0.1 4 23.0 593 30.8 1169 27.5 1762 18.1 437  21.0 908  20.0 1345 22.1 653 14.8 481 18.1 1134
30 to 35 20.4 482  2.1 49  10.0 531 1.5 31 4.8 108 3.4 139 22.9 482  19.4 782  20.7 1264 44.5 1306 52.3 1703 48.8 3009
35 to 40 15.7 321  16.3 454  16.1 775 19.6 408 14.9 443 16.9 851 1.6 36  2.9 121  2.5 157 3.0 90 13.4 470 8.6 560
40 to 45 30.2 645  27.2 734  28.5 1379 6.3 96 6.6 142 6.5 238 1.0 24  2.5 95  2.0 119 0.8 24 1.0 31 0.9 55
45 to 50 8.2 168  19.8 593  14.8 761 8.0 148 4.1 107 5.7 255 0.3 6  0.7 25  0.6 31 0.4 13 0.7 23 0.6 36
50 to 55 7.4 163  17.4 502  13.1 665 0.1 4 0.0 1 0.1 5 0.5 9  0.7 29  0.7 38 0.1 2 0.1 2 0.1 4
55 to 60 2.5 54  6.7 195  4.9 249 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.3 4  1.2 39  0.9 43 0.3 8 0.1 3 0.2 11
60 to 65 0.5 8  0.5 13  0.5 21 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 10 0.3 7 0.3 17
65 to 70 0.3 5  0.3 10  0.3 15 0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 1  0.0 1  0.0 2 0.7 21 0.2 6 0.4 27
70 to 75 0.2 4  0.3 10  0.3 14 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.0 5 0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 1 0.5 15 0.2 6 0.3 21
75 to 80 0.8 12  0.3 11  0.5 23 0.5 11 1.5 62 1.1 73 0.1 2  0.1 4  0.1 6 2.3 73 2.0 83 2.2 156
80 to 85 0.7 12  0.3 10  0.5 22 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.4 13 0.5 18 0.5 31
85 to 90 0.0 1  0.0 1  0.0 2 0.2 4 0.1 3 0.1 7 0.0 0  0.1 2  0.0 2 0.6 18 0.4 8 0.5 26
90 to 95 0.3 2  0.1 3  0.2 5 1.3 38 1.8 80 1.6 118 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.3 11 0.3 13 0.3 24
95 to 100 3.8 73  2.2 58  2.9 131 0.2 6 0.1 7 0.1 13 0.1 3  0.3 12  0.2 15 2.5 80 0.4 15 1.4 95
>100 0.4 9  0.4 10  0.4 19 0.0 1 0.2 11 0.1 12 0.7 12  0.1 8  0.3 20 0.4 12 0.2 6 0.3 18
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Table 9a. Median METRs by Household Disposable Income, Women and Men                
%  AT BE DK FI  FR GE GR IR  IT  LU NL PT SP UK 
Decile 
Group 
w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m 
1 30.6 47.1 31.5 7.5 51.2 51.2 37.4 28.8 33.8 35.1 47.6 52.3  0.0 0.0 3.5 5.0 15.4 21.1 13.1 13.1 33.9 39.4 15.0 80.0  0.0 0.0 50.5 20.0 
2 18.2 44.3 11.9 29.1 47.6 51.2 40.1 34.1 34.5 35.8 49.0 51.5  0.0 1.8 60.0 5.0 25.9 33.3 13.1 13.1 38.9 42.6 11.0 15.0  0.0 6.4 70.0 77.9 
3 18.2 44.0 39.0 43.6 51.2 51.2 40.1 42.0 33.2 34.9 52.3 49.8  0.0 15.0 28.7 45.0 26.8 39.2 13.8 17.8 36.4 41.8 15.5 18.9  6.4 20.5 33.0 33.0 
4 18.2 44.9 42.2 45.2 51.2 51.2 42.1 43.8 28.7 28.6 49.9 51.5  0.0 17.4 19.7 30.8 28.7 39.6 16.7 24.2 36.3 42.6 15.0 24.4  0.0 23.4 30.0 31.4 
5 39.0 45.0 44.0 46.9 51.2 51.2 43.9 44.3 29.1 28.5 52.6 51.5  2.6 30.0 24.0 27.2 33.2 39.6 22.0 27.6 34.5 42.6 15.0 26.0  1.9 24.6 30.0 32.1 
6 34.7 44.9 49.0 49.1 51.2 51.2 44.8 45.4 33.8 32.4 53.3 52.4  5.0 30.0 24.0 30.0 33.2 39.6 29.9 34.8 42.1 42.6 25.0 26.0 20.5 24.7 31.3 31.4 
7 43.4 45.5 49.2 49.9 51.2 51.2 45.0 49.3 34.9 33.9 53.5 52.0 23.3 30.0 28.5 30.8 33.3 39.6 38.5 39.5 42.6 42.6 26.0 26.0 23.3 28.2 30.0 31.4 
8 41.9 45.8 49.9 50.4 51.2 51.2 48.2 49.9 34.9 33.9 54.0 51.9 30.0 31.4 28.5 30.8 33.4 39.6 38.3 39.7 42.6 46.7 26.0 26.0 24.8 28.0 31.4 31.4 
9 45.7 47.0 50.3 50.4 51.2 62.4 49.9 50.7 35.7 35.0 54.2 51.4 31.2 36.5 48.2 48.2 39.6 39.8 46.1 45.1 42.6 50.0 36.0 36.0 28.0 29.0 31.4 31.4 
10 44.8 46.3 50.4 54.2 62.4 62.4 51.1 55.1 39.3 39.3 51.5 48.0 36.5 40.0 48.2 48.2 39.8 46.3 49.5 47.3 50.0 50.0 42.1 42.1 31.2 33.0 31.4 35.1 
 
 
Table 9b. Median METRs by Earnings, Women and Men                    
%  AT BE DK FI  FR GE GR IR  IT  LU NL PT SP UK 
Decile 
Group 
w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m w m 
1  0.0 44.0 37.4 11.9 51.2 51.2 39.1 40.5 31.8 32.5 29.0 46.2  0.0 0.0 24.0 5.0 21.2 21.6 13.1 22.8 33.9 42.6 15.0 15.5  0.0 6.4 10.0 23.0 
2 18.2 44.6 42.8 39.0 51.2 51.2 35.8 42.2 33.7 32.7 52.6 50.7  0.0 0.0 28.5 15.2 26.1 23.5 21.5 22.9 33.9 43.7 15.5 15.0  1.9 1.9 30.0 30.0 
3 42.6 43.8 46.0 45.1 51.2 51.2 35.8 36.5 34.1 34.9 51.2 47.8 13.7 2.9 28.5 25.5 33.3 33.3 27.5 22.9 36.4 38.5 26.0 24.9  0.2 6.4 30.0 31.4 
4 40.8 44.3 49.1 45.4 51.2 51.2 41.3 41.6 34.9 34.9 53.3 51.2 23.3 19.3 30.8 29.9 33.2 33.2 32.5 24.9 42.6 42.6 26.0 25.0 24.6 20.0 33.0 33.0 
5 42.0 42.1 50.4 49.9 51.2 51.2 44.8 44.3 34.9 34.9 52.9 51.9 31.2 15.0 30.8 30.8 33.2 33.2 36.4 25.5 42.6 42.6 26.0 26.0 28.0 24.1 31.4 33.0 
6 45.2 43.8 49.9 49.9 51.2 51.2 45.0 44.8 34.9 34.9 53.6 52.4 31.4 27.6 49.2 30.8 39.6 39.6 41.7 29.0 42.6 42.6 26.0 26.0 23.3 23.3 31.4 32.1 
7 45.2 46.0 50.4 49.9 51.2 51.2 49.9 49.5 34.9 34.9 54.2 53.0 38.4 30.8 49.2 30.8 39.6 39.6 47.0 34.4 40.0 39.4 36.0 26.0 28.0 26.6 31.4 31.4 
8 47.6 47.4 50.0 49.9 57.5 51.2 50.2 49.9 34.9 32.5 54.7 54.1 39.2 30.0 49.2 30.8 39.6 39.6 50.4 36.5 50.0 41.4 36.0 26.0 28.0 28.0 31.4 31.4 
9 52.8 51.2 50.4 50.4 62.4 62.4 50.7 50.7 35.7 33.9 56.8 51.7 36.5 36.5 48.3 48.3 40.2 42.4 50.6 43.3 49.6 50.0 37.0 36.0 31.7 29.2 26.2 25.7 
10 42.6 43.4 54.2 54.6 62.4 62.4 55.6 55.6 42.8 39.3 53.2 46.0 40.0 45.0 48.3 48.3 45.7 47.8 47.2 45.3 50.0 50.0 42.2 42.2 37.6 39.0 40.0 40.0 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. ‘Earnings’ are gross but do not include employer SIC. Earnings decile groups are those for all people with earnings (men and women). Decile groups of 
household disposable income are based on equivalised household incomes (see footnote 17).   44
 
Table 10. Distribution of METRs by Poverty Status                             
   AT BE DK  FI  FR GE GR 



























































<0 0.0 0  0.0 0  4.1 7  1.6 38  0.4 1  1.1 38 0.3 6  0.7 149  0.0 0  0.6 72  0.3 2  0.2 14  1.6 11  1.3 57 
0 15.4 28  11.6 382  32.5 52  6.2 143  1.8 3  1.2 30 24.4 306  9.3 2092  5.9 60  3.0 359  20.5 50  3.8 374  60.8 409  21.2 1059 
0 to 5 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 1 3.0 51  1.6 516  0.0 0  0.5 67  2.5 6  0.5 38  4.2 26  2.5 118 
5 to 10 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.6 1  0.0 1  8.0 17  0.0 0 1.4 14  0.8 147  0.0 0  0.9 99  0.0 0  0.0 3  1.2 8  0.9 42 
10 to 15 1.3 1  0.0 1  14.4 27  2.0 57  0.4 1  0.1 2 0.9 15  0.4 88  0.1 1  1.1 137  0.1 1  0.7 65  3.1 22  5.8 257 
15 to 20 7.4 10  6.2 178  1.6 3  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 1 0.4 4  0.4 76  2.4 21  1.9 221  0.0 0  0.3 48  19.4 125  3.9 184 
20 to 25 1.4 3  0.8 21  4.9 8  0.5 13  0.0 0  0.1 2 8.2 45  1.7 237  29.0 275  6.7 780  9.3 34  1.7 169  3.1 17  6.3 274 
25 to 30 3.7 4  0.4 17  4.3 6  1.1 26  0.0 0  0.1 2 10.8 59  3.4 378  0.9 9  15.3 1803  2.3 7  1.6 147  3.5 20  14.2 626 
30 to 35 4.7 5  1.8 55  4.5 11  1.7 45  0.0 0  0.0 1 6.0 32  2.9 367  12.5 116  34.6 4012  0.8 2  6.2 526  1.3 9  8.6 368 
35 to 40 4.5 8  7.3 210  5.1 11  4.6 113  0.0 0  0.0 0 1.9 16  4.5 570  15.9 142  17.1 1964  3.1 9  5.8 442  1.4 8  21.0 871 
40 to 45 12.7 18  25.9 738  3.0 4  7.9 202  0.0 0  0.0 0 2.5 24  15.9 1861  9.9 84  6.9 776  3.6 14  6.7 551  0.2 1  4.8 192 
45 to 50 5.4 11  25.8 754  2.2 5  29.7 818  34.5 73  9.3 330 1.4 12  21.4 2560  4.5 38  5.6 617  7.0 13  12.2 1101  0.0 0  5.9 235 
50 to 55 5.3 10  11.2 304  1.3 3  37.7 1060  36.9 72  52.1 1798 1.3 13  19.9 2559  2.8 23  1.3 147  3.3 9  32.9 3072  0.0 0  1.0 47 
55 to 60 2.0 4  6.3 160  1.7 2  4.2 116  6.5 11  1.7 57 1.0 7  11.9 1835  0.8 8  0.8 89  0.5 4  18.8 1518  0.0 0  1.0 41 
60 to 65 4.8 5  0.5 18  0.0 0  0.8 24  4.2 14  30.6 1032 1.4 9  2.2 364  1.1 8  0.6 65  3.3 6  2.2 180  0.0 0  0.0 2 
65 to 70 0.4 1  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.7 1  0.8 25 0.7 6  0.4 28  1.4 13  0.2 21  18.6 38  1.3 129  0.0 0  0.1 2 
70 to 75 0.1 1  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.4 13 1.2 9  0.3 30  0.1 1  0.3 38  0.5 3  0.5 51  0.0 0  0.0 0 
75 to 80 0.0 0  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.4 11 1.2 5  0.3 25  0.1 1  0.3 36  2.9 2  0.7 41  0.0 0  0.0 0 
80 to 85 0.0 0  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.5 46 1.4 9  0.2 19  0.0 0  0.2 23  0.0 0  0.3 43  0.0 0  0.0 0 
85 to 90 0.0 0  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 1 1.4 6  0.1 13  0.2 2  0.2 29  0.0 0  0.1 11  0.0 0  0.0 0 
90 to 95 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.0 0  0.0 0 0.8 6  0.0 4  0.0 0  0.7 87  0.0 0  0.0 2  0.0 0  0.0 1 
95 to 100 27.9 49  0.8 28  19.5 35  1.4 35  6.0 11  0.4 15 27.5 162  1.8 122  10.5 96  0.7 81  16.2 60  2.1 197  0.0 0  0.0 0 
>100 3.1 5  0.9 22  0.4 1  0.3 9  0.7 2  0.1 5 0.7 4  0.1 7  1.7 14  0.5 51  5.1 13  1.5 122  0.2 2  1.4 56 
   100.0 163  100.00 2900  100.0 176  100.00 2708  100.0 206  100.00 3410 100.0 820  100.00 14047  100.0 912  100.00 11574  100.0 273  100.00 8844  100.0 658  100.00 4432 
 
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. Frequencies are derived using weights supplied in the micro-data. 
See text for explanations. Modal values are shown in bold typeface. ‘Poor’ persons are those living in households with per-capita income of less than 60% of median equivalised 
household disposable income.   45
 
Table 10. (continued)                                         
   IR IT LU  NL  PT  SP  UK 



























































<0 0.0 0  0.0 0 0.1 1  0.0 2  0.0 0  0.1 2  17.6 41  2.8 124 0.0 0  0.0 0  1.7 9  0.2 8  0.0 0  0.0 0
0 20.2 24  13.3 780 9.8 92  15.6 1150  4.7 13  7.0 219  10.1 27  2.9 129 22.1 176  11.3 504  53.4 350  20.3 1128  16.9 57  3.8 249
0 to 5 38.2 41  3.9 210 4.4 24  0.2 16  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 3 0.2 1  0.0 2  7.4 50  0.7 45  0.0 0  0.0 2
5 to 10 3.3 5  0.7 57 18.3 165  1.1 94  0.1 1  0.7 15  0.2 1  0.0 0 0.5 5  0.3 15  22.2 145  4.2 235  1.7 6  1.7 107
10 to 15 0.0 0  2.2 174 1.9 15  0.1 13  66.5 168  12.6 352  0.0 0  0.0 2 33.0 252  11.4 548  0.4 2  0.3 24  0.3 1  0.1 6
15 to 20 0.0 0  4.0 224 2.9 20  0.6 53  1.6 3  5.1 135  0.0 0  0.1 3 3.5 43  4.1 212  5.3 36  4.0 221  8.4 30  1.8 111
20 to 25 1.0 1  6.5 334 9.0 84  1.2 92  4.3 10  3.2 80  0.0 0  0.0 2 0.6 9  6.9 339  6.3 40  17.5 1027  0.8 3  8.5 526
25 to 30 0.6 1  11.8 503 8.7 87  3.3 260  2.4 7  6.1 182  0.3 1  0.0 3 13.3 124  29.4 1638  0.0 0  22.2 1345  6.7 25  18.7 1109
30 to 35 0.0 0  13.9 594 23.4 217  18.2 1318  2.1 6  11.9 329  11.0 28  9.9 503 0.5 5  3.8 134  0.2 4  22.9 1260  7.2 25  51.1 2984
35 to 40 2.5 2  1.2 59 3.7 40  25.1 1978  0.7 3  11.6 321  20.3 44  15.8 731 0.1 3  19.0 848  0.2 1  2.7 156  1.2 4  9.1 556
40 to 45 0.8 1  2.4 119 6.1 59  6.8 519  0.0 0  11.4 287  16.1 51  29.2 1328 0.0 0  7.3 238  0.0 0  2.2 119  1.9 7  0.9 48
45 to 50 1.7 2  22.6 949 2.8 32  18.0 1273  0.8 1  16.9 393  0.0 0  15.6 761 0.0 0  6.4 255  0.0 0  0.6 31  0.9 3  0.6 33
50 to 55 0.0 0  13.0 473 1.1 6  5.5 402  0.0 0  11.4 282  0.0 0  13.8 665 0.0 0  0.1 5  0.0 0  0.7 38  0.2 1  0.1 3
55 to 60 22.7 21  0.8 33 0.5 4  0.6 39  0.3 1  1.1 27  0.0 0  5.2 249 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.2 1  1.0 42  0.0 0  0.2 11
60 to 65 3.8 4  0.9 48 0.6 4  0.5 43  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.2 3  0.4 18 0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.0 4  0.3 13
65 to 70 0.0 0  0.1 8 0.1 3  0.3 27  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.8 3  0.3 12 0.0 1  0.0 0  0.2 2  0.0 0  3.8 13  0.2 14
70 to 75 0.0 0  0.2 6 1.5 8  0.3 16  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.9 3  0.2 11 0.2 3  0.0 2  0.1 1  0.0 0  2.8 10  0.2 11
75 to 80 0.0 0  0.4 17 0.0 0  0.2 23  0.3 1  0.0 2  1.2 5  0.5 18 9.8 73  0.0 0  0.5 3  0.1 3  21.1 87  1.1 69
80 to 85 3.2 3  0.2 11 0.5 3  0.5 36  0.0 0  0.0 1  0.6 3  0.5 19 0.2 2  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  3.7 14  0.3 17
85 to 90 0.0 0  0.0 3 0.2 1  0.1 11  5.2 11  0.1 3  0.0 0  0.0 2 0.9 7  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 2  3.8 11  0.3 15
90 to 95 0.0 0  0.0 1 0.4 6  0.1 8  9.1 16  0.2 4  0.0 0  0.2 5 12.8 116  0.2 2  0.0 0  0.0 0  1.9 8  0.2 16
95 to 100 2.0 3  0.5 21 0.5 5  0.4 25  0.6 1  0.0 1  17.0 47  2.1 84 1.1 13  0.0 0  1.3 7  0.1 8  14.2 53  0.7 42
>100 0.0 0  1.3 55 3.5 22  1.2 92  1.3 2  0.4 11  2.7 6  0.3 13 1.2 12  0.0 0  0.6 6  0.3 14  1.3 4  0.2 14
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Figure 1. 
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Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. 
See text for explanations. Zero values are shown for AETR bands containing fewer than 10 observations. Graphs 
in figure 1 need to be read in conjunction with table 1.  47
Figure 1. (continued) 
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Figure 1. (continued) 
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Figure 1. (continued) 




























































































































































Social Assistance / Minimum Income
Own SIC
Income Tax
"tax base" relative to median (right hnd sc)
 



















































































































































































































































































































   50
Figure 1. (continued) 
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Figure 2. 






















































































"tax base" relative to
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Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. 
See text for explanations. Zero values are shown for AETR bands containing fewer than 10 observations. Graphs 
in figure 2 need to be read in conjunction with table 6a.   52
Figure 2. (continued) 
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Figure 2. (continued) 
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Figure 2. (continued) 
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Figure 2. (continued) 
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45 degrees
 
Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. 
See text for explanations.   56
Figure 4. 
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Source: EUROMOD, author’s calculations. 
See text for explanations. Zero values are shown for METR bands containing fewer than 10 observations. 
Graphs need to be read in conjunction with table 8.   57
Figure 4. (continued) 
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Figure 4. (continued) 
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Figure 4. (continued) 
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Figure 4. (continued) 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources. 
 
 
Country  Base Dataset for EUROMOD  Date of 
collection 
Reference time 
period for incomes 
Austria  European Community Household Panel (W2)  1996  annual 1995 
Belgium  Panel Survey on Belgian Households (W6)  1997  annual 1996 
Denmark  European Community Household Panel (W2)   1995  annual 1994 
Finland  Income distribution survey   1997  annual 1996 
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5  annual 1993/4 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel (W15) 1998  annual  1997 
Greece  European Community Household Panel (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Ireland  Living in Ireland Survey (W1)  1994  month in 1994 
Italy  Survey of Households Income and Wealth   1996  annual 1995 
Luxembourg PSELL-2  (W5)  1999  annual  1998 
Netherlands  Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Portugal  European Community Household Panel (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Spain  European Community Household Panel (W3)  1996  annual 1995 
Sweden  Income distribution survey   1997  annual 1996 
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   1995/6  month in 1995/6 
 
 
  